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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND WELFARE BENEFIT 
BY HIZKIA HENDRICK DAVID TASIK 
JULY 2015 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Yongsheng Xu 
Major Department: Economics 
 This dissertation explores the information asymmetry problem between government and 
applicants of means-tested welfare benefits. The first chapter examines the problem in a static 
setting. To meet benefit eligibility, individuals reduce their labor supply so that they meet the 
required income level. This action enables them to increase their payoff but makes it difficult for 
government to differentiate the needy from the non-needy. Using a signaling game model and 
incorporating income-related ordeals (i.e. required-hour and essential component) as the signals, 
this study finds that government can mitigate the problem, increase social welfare, and maintain 
income-based eligibility requirements.  
The second chapter investigates the effect of the asymmetry when benefit applicants have 
choices of where and when to apply, and the solution to the asymmetry problem.  Jurisdiction 
differential in net benefit may induce a migration from a low to a high net-benefit jurisdiction. 
Likewise, individuals may choose to procrastinate on the application process if they find that 
applying later gives higher net-benefit than applying now. Consequently, these behaviors create 
information asymmetry. Using a signaling game model, the result shows that, after accounting 
for required-hour and essential component, the individuals have no incentive to migrate or 
procrastinate on the application process in order to be eligible.   
  
The third chapter evaluates the solution to the problem when maintaining a particular 
take-up rate is also a government’s objective. Imposing an ordeal in the welfare system is 
expected to help government direct the benefit to the needy but this may reduce the take-up rate. 
Conditioning on any particular take-up rate that the government aims to achieve, the models 
provide a solution on how to distinguish the types of applicants without harming the take-up rate. 
Using 2013 U.S. state level data, the model predicts that adjusting the cutoff level of the ordeals 
may change the take-up rates anywhere between 0.008 and 9.233 percent. This range represents 
the total number of marginal individuals who are in the programs. This sheds some light on what 
particular cutoff level of ordeals a government should impose so that it does not harm the 
targeted take-up rates. 
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CHAPTER 1 DOUBLE-SIGNAL ANALYSES TO MITIGATE INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY WITHIN WELFARE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There have been many programs provided by government to improve one’s well-being. 
Feldstein (2005) divides the types of programs into two, namely, social insurance programs 
which are event-conditioned and welfare programs which are means-tested.  
In the U.S. means-tested programs, proof of income or assets is the main criterion of 
welfare benefit eligibility. However there are, at least, two problems may occur. Firstly, not all 
applicants may be able to provide the proof due to various reasons (e.g. out of job, misplacing, 
etc.) and this will lead to low benefit take-up ratio. Secondly, those who can provide the proof 
may have incentives to engage in a behavior that enables them to provide the lowest possible 
paychecks1. According to Gruber (2009, pp. 500-503), welfare benefit may give incentive to 
individuals whose income levels are slightly above the eligibility threshold of income (hereafter, 
marginal individuals) and to those whose income levels are below the threshold to reduce their 
labor supply when they find the benefit increase their utility without having to maintain the same 
labor supply.  
Both problems contribute to information asymmetry between government and the 
applicants in which the government is unable to completely observe the level of income and to 
identify which applicants are truly eligible for the benefit; while at the same time this asymmetry 
gives incentives to ineligible applicants to game the system (e.g. by not saving, not working or 
                                                 
1 For example, they collude with their employers to have paychecks in which the income written on the paychecks is 
lower than the actual income received. Such behavior may be observed in informal sector. 
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reducing their working hours) in order to be eligible (Besley & Coate, 1992; Feldstein, 2005) J. 
Currie and Gahvari (2008) agree that the ineligible applicants take steps to reduce their incomes 
to make themselves eligible for the benefit. For simplicity, this paper calls the truly eligible 
applicants as true poor and those who game the system as fake poor. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate the performance of an ordeal mechanism with double signals (i.e. required-hour 
and electricity usage) in mitigating the information asymmetry within means-tested welfare 
programs. Particularly, this study investigates how the double-signal approach helps government 
address the information asymmetry issue by revealing the true poor so that it can improve social 
welfare; shows how using the double-signal approach is better in improving the social welfare 
than using a single-signal approach (i.e. either time or essential component); addresses how the 
existing applicants behave in the presence of information asymmetry compared to that in the 
absence of it; shows how big the optimal size of ordeals (i.e. the cutoff level) is government can 
potentially impose, and shows what changes may occur in the social welfare after introducing the 
double-signal approach. Using the approach, the study finds that government can mitigate the 
asymmetry problem, increase the social welfare, and maintain the fact that all eligibility 
requirements are income-related. 
This study contributes to the literatures in four respects. Firstly, this study takes initial 
steps towards modeling the information asymmetry within the welfare programs using signaling 
game model and introduces double-signal approach which utilizes time and essential components 
to construct a cutoff. Secondly, this study also takes initial steps towards modeling the welfare 
eligibility using essential component, i.e. electricity usage, as a proxy to income. Thirdly, this 
study formulates ways government can take in order to mitigate the information asymmetry. 
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Fourthly, this study may give guidance to government on the size of the ordeals that should be 
imposed given the observed signals. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the literature review. 
Section III elaborates the signals that are used in this study. Section IV describes the model. 
Section V analyzes four different cases (first-best, information asymmetry, single-signal and 
double-signal cases). Section VI presents the comparison analyses. Section VII presents a brief 
discussion. Section VIII provides the concluding remarks. 
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many have paid attention on the information asymmetry within government welfare 
programs. According to Gruber (2009), targeting and ordeal mechanism are two approaches that 
could be used to mitigate the information asymmetry, in particular, to reduce the moral hazards 
in welfare programs. While targeting was to direct the benefit to the needy ones, the ordeal 
mechanism was to help the targeting. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) emphasized that welfare 
programs would perform better if the programs incorporated restrictions, such as means-tested 
in-kind transfers, commodity-specific taxes and subsidies, and even ordeals, than if they relied 
only on cash transfers. In line with that, Blumkin, Margalioth, and Sadka (2014) emphasized that 
two devices that government could use to overcome the information asymmetry problem were 
direct screening devices (e.g. means-testing by reviewing documentation, conducting interviews, 
and testing by specialists) and indirect screening (e.g. targeting groups, targeting benefits, and 
welfare ordeals that added requirements to the program that undeserving individuals would find 
relatively costly and hence, self-selected out the program so only the most-needy remained).  
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Two distinct arguments about welfare ordeals and their approaches were obvious in the 
literatures. On one hand, based on a field experiment in Indonesia, Alatas et al. (2013) found that 
ordeal mechanisms (through imposing time and distance as the ordeals) could induce self-
selection, but marginally increasing the ordeal could impose additional costs on applicants 
without necessarily improving targeting. As a part of their experiment, a welfare benefit survey 
was publicly conducted, for example, by inquiring about one’s assets. On the other hand, Besley 
and Coate (1992, 1995) showed that by introducing a work requirement as the ordeal (i.e. work 
in public sector in order to qualify), government could target the benefits to the neediest ones. 
Work requirement might help direct poor support toward the true poor in a way that only the true 
poor presented themselves (Besley & Coate, 1992). As to improve Besley and Coate’s study, 
Gahvari and Mattos (2007) and J. Currie and Gahvari (2008) introduced cash transfer combined 
with in-kind transfer in the ordeal mechanism. Gahvari and Mattos (2007) argued that welfare 
could be attained when it required the quality level of publicly provided good to be less than 
efficient for the poor, particularly, in addition to Besley and Coate’s provision, transfer was 
necessary so that with provision and transfer, deadweight loss could be avoided. Moreover, J. 
Currie and Gahvari (2008) argued that when in-kind transfers, instead of cash transfers, were 
used as redistributive tools, these transfers might serve as a separation device between the rich 
and the poor. Despite the approaches mentioned above, there were drawbacks that raise 
concerns. Firstly, a welfare benefit survey that was publicly conducted might not capture the true 
information about individuals since individuals had incentives not to report the truth. Secondly, 
there might be an alteration in labor supply: the introduction of a work requirement as the ordeal 
might give incentive to fake poor applicants to be in the program if the work load in public sector 
was less than his work load in private sector. Consequently, there would be a shift from more to 
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less productive job but total income received remained unchanged. Moreover, the new job might 
not have productive value (Piketty & Saez, 2012). This job shifting would result in reduction in 
labor supply of private sector, so called crowding-out. Additionally, as Kwon and Meyer (2011) 
pointed out, welfare participation would be very low when welfare programs had a strong 
emphasis on work requirement, particularly during economic downturns. Thirdly, in some cases, 
however, the behavior of the poor in response to receiving in-kind transfer would be similar to 
the one in response to receiving cash transfers. The transfer enabled the recipients to increase 
their consumption on other goods, assuming that they would have had enough income to cover 
the goods that would otherwise be covered by the transfers. The main concern here was not on 
what individuals received but how they received. Fourthly, treating ordeals as screening devices 
as discussed in the literatures above would create a tendency that a fake poor to engage in a 
behavior to meet the ordeals’ cutoffs or a true poor to behave differently (e.g. became 
discouraged). Fifthly, using ordeals that were not correlated to or did not represent income (e.g. 
work requirement) might reduce the essence of welfare programs as means-tested programs since 
income was no longer the crucial component of eligibility.  
 
III.  THE SIGNALS 
To mitigate the information asymmetry while, at the same time, overcome the drawbacks, 
this study introduces a different ordeal mechanism. Firstly, the ordeals are treated as signaling 
devices. Therefore, this study uses signaling game model to help solve the information 
asymmetry. Secondly, there are two signals (so called double signals) used in this mechanism. 
They are time (i.e. total hours required to complete the application process) and essential 
component (e.g. utility bills). These signals are correlated to income so they maintain the essence 
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of welfare programs as means-tested programs. Practically, a government does not need to 
announce the cutoffs of the signals and this approach does not require a public survey to 
determine one’s income/assets status since the ordeals used are the ones that have correlation 
with income. The approach does not result in a labor supply alteration as a consequence of 
imposition of the ordeals and reduces the likelihood that individuals engage in a behavior to meet 
the ordeals’ cutoff since, unlike screening model, signaling model does not require government 
to announce the cutoff before the individuals decide to apply.  
Indeed, one issue with multiple signals is that it may be hard to show that a separating set 
exists since the informed party (i.e. the applicants) is not completely ordered by their cost of 
increasing the signals. However, when quasiconvexity condition holds, a separating set exists 
(Engers, 1987). Two signals, time and essential component, used in this paper are both proxies to 
the unobservable variable (i.e. income) to some extent and both have monotonicity property with 
regard to income. Engers (1987) points out that any monotonic function of a single variable is 
quasiconvex and therefore, the separating set exists. 
These signals have their own characteristics which enforce the advantages of having two 
signals instead of one. Firstly, while essential component captures the “true” income, time has 
twofold advantage, namely, it reflects one’s opportunity cost, e.g. market wage rate (Gruber, 
2009) and it indirectly confirms the income status that may potentially be inferred by essential 
component. It is assumed that the observable characteristics of both types other than those 
affecting the value of time are similar. Secondly, the essential component is characterized by a 
good or a service that an individual must inevitably have or cannot avoid consuming in a 
particular geographic area or shelter. This is to ensure that all individuals have access not only to 
time but also to the essential component. That said, administratively, the individuals may easily 
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provide the essential component (e.g. utility bills) and the probability of making excuse that they 
do not have such bills are, if any, small. This component may also be characterized by an 
argument that the more the consumption the richer the individual is and that the consumption 
may reflects the individual’s total income. Thirdly, it may be painful for the individuals to 
maintain low electricity usage for a particular period (required by the government) if their 
normal usage is above the eligibility threshold, therefore the possibility that individuals lower the 
usage in order to be eligible may also be minimized. Fourthly, both are, in different respects, 
correlated to income. Time is correlated to income through a value one places on time (e.g. 
market wage rate). Particularly, those who have high income tend to spend less time in less-
valued activities than those who have low income. On the other hand, essential component is 
directly correlated to income. Fifthly, either signal works as a backup. Particularly, if there is a 
problem with one of the signals; the other signal may still be able to help reveal the individual’s 
income status. For example, there may be a possibility that high income individuals (HII) spend 
much as time as the low income individuals (LII) since HII are on vacation/leave when they 
apply. Therefore, HHI’s opportunity costs at that time do not reflect the real opportunity cost. 
Given the characteristic above, the essential component may help government make some 
evaluations. Additionally, it is worth noting that given the second and the third characteristics 
above, such problem is unlikely to occur with regard to essential component. One may ask, why 
not using essential component as the only signal? The answer is that it is hard to make an 
inference about one’s labor income which may be better explained by one’s opportunity cost. In 
addition, another benefit of having two signals is that the weight of ordeal may be well 
distributed across signal. For example, instead of extremely increasing the application time to 
separate fake from true poor that may also reduce the numbers of take-up, government may 
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slightly change the time and the essential component.  However, in this study, there is no 
restriction imposed on the correlation between these signals. Since the literature on the topic is 
vast, it is inevitable that I have to limit the scope of discussion. In particular, it will focus on the 
information asymmetry that exists in means-tested welfare programs but only in general case. 
Additionally, in order to provide the basic model, this study rules out the need of tax, 
transportation availability, communication access, applicant’s non-welfare spending-generated 
payoff and all variables other than those accounted in the model. The essential component in this 
study is electricity usage. That said, this study is only applicable to states or countries where 
electricity is used by nearly everyone.  
The idea of using electricity usage as the essential component was based on the 
consensus that electricity had direct relationship with income (Acton, Mitchell, & Mowill, 1976; 
Alberini, Gans, & Velez-Lopez, 2011; Filippini & Pachauri, 2004; Francisco, Aranha, Zambaldi, 
& Goldszmidt, 2007; Marcus, Ruszovan, & Nahigian, 2002).2 Specific to low-income 
households, Davis, Hughes, and Louw (2008) showed that the relationship between electricity 
and income was also observed in poor households in two small rural towns in South Africa. They 
concluded that, in addition to the presence of electric cooking appliance, income was also a key 
determinant of electricity usage.3 The same finding was also discussed in Louw, Conradie, 
Howells, and Dekenah (2008) and Meier, Jamasb, and Orea (2012). In their extensive analysis 
about the relationship of energy and poverty, Pachauri and Spreng (2004), argued that energy 
                                                 
2Other studies also find that energy usage, either electricity, gas or both, increases with income (Blázquez, Boogen, 
& Filippini, 2013; Brutscher, 2011; Cebula, 2012; Dubin & McFadden, 1984; Espey & Espey, 2004; Halvorsen, 
1975; Jamasb & Meier, 2010; Neeland, 2009; OECD, 2008). Additionally, Yohanis, Mondol, Wright, and Norton 
(2008) and Pombeiro, Silva, and Pina (2012) show how the profile is differentiated between night and daytime. 
3 Those households falling within the lowest two quintiles of income where the threshold would be approximately 
R800 per household. They are also the recipients of Free Basic Electricity (FBE), a basic services support tariff, 
allocating an allowance of 50kWh of free electricity each month to the poor. However, the pattern is the same in 
both pre- and post-implementation of FBE, that is, the usage of electricity increases as income of the low-income 
households increase. 
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usage (such as electricity, LPG, kerosene, biomass, etc.) could serve as a useful measure of 
poverty and was better than a conventional monetary measure, which equated poverty with 
material deprivation and defined the poor in terms of income or levels of consumption of 
adequate amounts of food, clothing, shelter (Pradhan & Ravallion, 1998), water, sanitation, 
health care and education. Moreover, according to Khandker, Barnes, and Samad (2010), the 
energy poverty line could be defined as the threshold point at which energy usage began to rise 
with increases in household income. A study in UK households in deciles 1 and 2 conducted by 
White, Roberts, and Preston (2010) set the threshold at the mean, i.e. 3,903 kWh, and found that 
there were 642,041 households consumed electricity above the threshold. Another threshold 
might be based on minimum energy requirement for the poor (Blocker, 1985) set by government 
if the government aimed to help those whose energy usage was below the minimum. Barnes, 
Khandker, and Samad (2010) and Foster, Tre, and Wodon (2000) were also supportive to the 
idea that energy usage could be a measure of poverty.  
 
IV.  THE MODEL 
Consider a signaling game of welfare benefit, represented as a 6-tuple ℊ =
{𝑇, (𝑟, 𝑒), 𝑏, 𝜌, 𝑈, 𝑊}, which consists of two players, a sender (S) which is drawn from a group of 
welfare applicants with two types, and a receiver (R) which is a government; and specifies a 
space of the sender’s type 𝑇 = {𝑡, 𝑡̅}, a space of sender’s signal  𝜁 = {𝑟, 𝑒} which are the 
required-hour (i.e. time) 𝑟 and electricity usage as the essential component 𝑒, a space of 
receiver’s action 𝑏, a prior probability 𝜌 that S is of type 𝑡 where 𝜌(𝑡) ∈ [0,1) and ∑ 𝜌(𝑡)𝑡 = 1, 
a payoff function of senders 𝑈, and a payoff function of receiver 𝑊. S receives private 
information which is S’s type 𝑡, drawn from a finite set of types 𝑇. The sender’s type is drawn 
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according to some probability distribution 𝜌 over 𝑇. That is the probability is given by 𝜌 if S is 
of type 𝑡 (so called true poor), and 1 − 𝜌 if S is of type 𝑡̅ (so called fake poor); 𝜌 is common 
knowledge. Since the types are ordered according to income level, it is normal to restrict that 𝑡 <
𝑡̅ which implies that the income of true poor is lower than that of fake poor. Note that, from now 
on, any variable 𝑣 and ?̅? are associated to 𝑡 and 𝑡̅ types of S respectively, that is 𝑣 = 𝑣(𝑡) and 
?̅? = 𝑣(𝑡)̅. Having learnt his type, S sends signals (𝑟, 𝑒) to R chosen out of some finite set (ℛ, ℰ). 
The set of signals available to S depends upon S’s type, that is, (ℛ(𝑡), ℰ(𝑡)) are the signals 
available to type 𝑡. 𝑇(𝑟, 𝑒) is the set of types that have signals (𝑟, 𝑒). It is worth pointing out that 
the game of welfare benefit starts only when the individuals choose to apply which then enables 
them to send signals. That being said, this study assumes that the individuals apply. R observes 
(𝑟, 𝑒) but not 𝑡 and then chooses an action 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, a finite set of actions. The action depends on 
the signals received, writing 𝐵(𝑟, 𝑒). The game ends with this action, and payoffs are made to the 
two players. The players have von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff functions. The sender’s payoff 
function is defined over type 𝑡, private goods consumption 𝑥′, signal (𝑟, 𝑒), leisure 𝑙 and action 
𝑏, writing 𝑈(𝑡, 𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)), while the receiver’s payoff function is defined over type 𝑡, non-
welfare spending 𝐺, signal (𝑟, 𝑒), and action 𝑏, writing 𝑊(𝑡, 𝐺, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)). These functions are 
taken to be continuous in (𝑟, 𝑒) and 𝑏; and continuously differentiable. 𝑈𝐵(ℛ,ℰ) > 0, 𝑈r < 0 and 
𝑈e < 0 are assumed, so that the sender prefers to send more signals to induce larger actions at 
the cost of their overall payoff. That said, there exists ?̂? ∈ 𝑇, ?̂? ∈ 𝑟 and ?̂? ∈ 𝑒 such that 
𝑈(?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑏(?̂?, ?̂?)) < 𝑈(?̂?, ?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑏(?̅?, ?̅?)) where ?̂? is the highest possible level of 𝑟 and ?̂? is the 
lowest possible level of 𝑒 that both levels might incur the highest possible cost of signaling. This 
implies the signals’ boundary condition that makes sending high signals (higher than sufficient 
levels) unattractive for the highest type ?̂?. As for the receiver, 𝑊 is strictly quasiconcave in 𝐵 for 
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each (ℛ, ℰ) and 𝑡, with 𝑊 maximized in 𝐵 by 𝐵∗((ℛ, ℰ), 𝑡). Moreover, 𝑊𝐵 is strictly decreasing 
in 𝑡 for each (ℛ, ℰ) and 𝐵, which implies that 𝐵∗((ℛ, ℰ), 𝑡) is strictly decreasing in 𝑡. Intuitively, 
the receiver will choose larger action if she can be convinced that 𝑡 is smaller.  
The optimal levels of signals 𝑟∗ and 𝑒∗ give the cutoffs of the signals with 0 < ?̅? < 𝑟∗ ≤
𝑟 and 0 < 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒∗ < ?̅?. Let 𝑚 be the per-hour opportunity cost such that 0 < 𝑚 < ?̅? where 𝑚 =
𝑚(𝑡) and ?̅? = 𝑚(𝑡̅) and let 𝑟𝑚 be the total opportunity cost such that 𝑚𝑟 < ?̅?𝑟. I want to make 
a similar assumption as in a conventional model of signaling games, that is, equilibrium requires 
that higher types are more willing to send higher signal to induce higher action. Particularly, the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of signal for action is decreasing in type. In this study, the 
same monotonicity property is also required in different dimension. Note that, due to cost 
associated to the signals and to the types, higher (lower) type has higher (lower) cost of sending 
signal ?̅? but lower (higher) cost of sending signal ?̅?. That said, higher type has higher electricity 
usage but lower required-hour, writing ?̅? > 𝑒 and ?̅? < 𝑟 for all 𝑡̅ > 𝑡. Although the direction of 
change of the signals is different between 𝑟 and 𝑒 over 𝑡, the change of both signals is monotone. 
To avoid confusion that may arise from different direction of change of both signals, the 
direction is made equivalent since the concern here is not on the direction of change but on how 
much the change is. In this case, increasing 𝑟 means that the sender increases the required-hour, 
while increasing 𝑒 means that the sender decreases the electricity usage. So to make it 
equivalent, increasing 𝑒 means that the sender hypothetically buys one ticket for every one unit 
reduction in electricity usage. 
Assumption 1. The signals are strictly monotone and continuous in type. That is, signal 𝑒 
is strictly increasing while signal 𝑟 is strictly decreasing in 𝑡 and the cost of increasing signals is 
increasing in types. 
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This assumption defines the costs associated to the signals. The cost of sending signal of 
a higher type is bigger than that of the lower type. Higher type has more electricity usage but less 
time available for the application process than lower type. When the optimal levels of signals 𝑟∗ 
and 𝑒∗, such that 0 < ?̅? < 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑟 and 0 < 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒∗ < ?̅?, are required, moving monotonically and 
continuously toward the optimal levels is less painful for the lower type than the higher type 
which makes the cost imposed to the higher type bigger than that to the lower type. That said, as 
long as the change is monotone and continuous, it is still possible to show that MRS is increasing 
in type (i.e. 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒) which ensures that the indifference curves through a particular 
point have larger slopes for larger types. This implies a single-crossing property of indifference 
curves. Consequently, the different slopes make it possible for lower type to separate from the 
higher type.  
 
V.  THE CASES 
This section presents four different cases (first-best, information asymmetry, single-
signal and double-signal cases) to give a big picture about the effects of information asymmetry 
and the use of signal(s) on players’ payoff functions. In all cases, the applicant is assumed to 
have a Cobb-Douglas preference while the government has utilitarian payoff function. For clarity 
purposes, in both first-best and information asymmetry cases, there are only an applicant and a 
government but there is no sender and receiver which, in turn, means that there is no signal being 
sent. Of all variables in the applicant’s payoff function, benefit is the only variable that 
government can control in order to improve social welfare which is of interest of this study. 
Since this study assumes ceteris paribus, this study evaluates the changes in applicant’s payoff as 
the benefit changes through the partial contribution of benefit to the applicant’s payoff (i.e. 
13 
 
marginal contribution of benefit, MCB).  Evaluating the changes in MCBs is important since all 
players (or so-called agents in the first-best and the information asymmetry cases) are assumed to 
be payoff maximizers so that they will respond (i.e. by applying for the benefit or not) to any 
changes in MCBs. One thing worth pointing out is that this study assumes that everyone applies 
for the benefit in order to make the MCB derivation possible. Once MCB is found, a government 
may adjust the components of MCB in order to discourage the fake poor (i.e. make the fake poor 
opt-out from application) so that the type separation may be possible. Additionally, since 
government has utilitarian payoff function, changes in MCB can reflect the changes in social 
welfare. Therefore, this study focuses on an applicant’s MCB in order to capture the effect of 
changes in government policy. To focus on each case, this section does not make any 
comparison of the cases. The comparison is presented in the next section. 
 
a. First-Best Case 
In the first-best case, the model has two agents: applicant and government. There is no 
sender and receiver since it is assumed that government has full information about the applicant. 
Therefore, sending signal is not necessary. The applicant consists of two types: true poor and 
fake poor. In the real world, the applicants of welfare benefits are likely to be differentiated 
based on level of income 𝑦. In particular, the true poor has income level 𝑦 while the fake poor 
(i.e. richer applicant) has income level 𝑦 > 𝑦. When government has full information, it only 
gives benefit to the true poor (i.e. type 𝑡) with income level 𝑦. So there is no fake poor in this 
case. Therefore, all variables used are associated with true poor’s characteristics, so there are no 
underbar variables. In this study, the MCB received by the true poor serve as the benchmark. 
The idea of using this MCB as the benchmark is to get a picture about how this MCB is 
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compared to that when information asymmetry presents and when the double signals (𝑟, 𝑒) take 
place. Let time endowment 𝐻 be used up for labor ℎ and leisure 𝑙 i.e. 𝐻 = ℎ + 𝑙. At tax rate 𝜏, 
government revenue is generated from labor income and non-labor income and used up for the 
government expenditure on public goods 𝐺 at price 𝑝𝑔 and welfare benefit 𝑏(. ). The true poor 
maximizes his payoff function 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑦)) subjects to the budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 +
(1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝐻 + 𝑏(𝑦) = (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝑙 + 𝑝𝑥𝑥, where 𝑥 is consumption of private goods that costs 𝑝𝑥, 
𝑙 is time consumption of leisure priced at 𝑚, 𝑦 = (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝐻 − (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝑙 is total 
income, 𝜑 is potential non-labor income, (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 is after-tax non-labor income and 
(1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝐻 − (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝑙 is after-tax labor income. The government maximizes the sum of 
sender’s payoff subjects to 𝑛𝜏𝜑 + 𝑛𝜏𝑚ℎ = 𝑝𝑔𝐺 + 𝑛𝑏(𝑦), where 𝑛 is total proportion of 
applicants which, in this case, consist of only true poor (see section b of appendix for details on 
the problem setup). Let 𝛽1 be the marginal contribution of private goods consumption, the 
resulting marginal contribution of benefit (MCB) is given by4  
𝛽3
∗ =
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ (
𝑃𝑔𝐺
𝑛
−𝜑−𝑚ℎ)
.  (1) 
Note that for sake of simplicity, instead of writing 
𝜕𝑏(𝑣)
𝜕𝑣
, the partial derivative of benefit 
with respect to any variable 𝑣 is written as 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑣
 since 𝑏(𝑣) = 𝑏. Equation (1) shows that the MCB 
is composed of characteristics of applicant and government. The characteristics that define the 
applicant are total income 𝑦, potential non-labor income 𝜑 and labor income 𝑚ℎ. In this case, 
government is assumed to have full information about applicant’s income. Having this 
information enables government to calculate how much the contribution of the benefit to the 
social welfare is and may help government evaluate whether or not such benefit is cost-effective 
                                                 
4 see section b of appendix for details on the problem setup 
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and cost-efficient in improving the social welfare. Additionally, since government has full 
information about the applicant’s income, government only provides the benefit to the true poor. 
 
b. Information Asymmetry Case 
The outcomes from the first-best case are favorable. Unfortunately, they do not represent 
the real world where the endowment of information is not symmetric among individuals. In this 
case, the information is about individual’s “true” income. Practically, there is a portion of 
income 𝛾 out of both labor and non-labor income that is not observable to government which 
may be due to tax evasion behaviors, informal sector activities or others. Shortly speaking, this is 
the case where a) income is the only indicator that government uses to distinguish the types of 
applicant; b) the indicator is incompletely observable; and c) government has to keep taking 
action 𝑏 (i.e. to keep running the welfare program and giving the benefits).  
Like in the first-best case, the model in this case has two agents: applicant and 
government. There is no sender and receiver since it is assumed that government does not have 
full information about the applicant and does not make any effort to distinguish the types of 
applicant yet. Therefore, sending signal is not necessary. Here, applicant maximizes the same 
payoff function as in the first-best case. However, unlike in the first-best case, the applicant may 
consist of either fake poor or true poor type. So, the true poor (fake poor) maximizes his payoff 
function given his income level 𝑦 (𝑦) subjects to his budget constraint. On the other hand, due to 
information asymmetry, government maximizes her payoff function, with probability 𝜌 that the 
applicant is a true poor and probability (1 − 𝜌) that the applicant is a fake poor, subjects to her 
budget constraint. The resulting MCBs of true poor and fake poor are, respectively, given by  
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𝛽3
∗ =
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾
ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))]
   
and  (2) 
𝛽3
∗ =
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))]
,   
where 𝜋 and 𝜋 = 1 − 𝜋 are the proportions of the true and fake poor applicants; 𝛽1 and 𝛽1 are 
the marginal contribution of private goods consumption of true poor and fake poor; 𝛾ℎ and 𝛾𝜑 
are the portions of true poor’s labor and non-labor income that are not observable; and 𝛾ℎ and 𝛾𝜑 
are the portions of fake poor’s labor and non-labor income that are not observable (see section b 
of appendix for details on the problem setup). Equation (2) shows that the MCB is also 
composed of characteristics of applicant and government. The characteristics that define the 
applicant are total income 𝑦, potential non-labor income 𝜑, labor income 𝑚ℎ and a portion of 
unobservable income 𝛾. Intuitively, equation (1) and (2) are similar when there is no 
unobservable income (i.e. 𝛾 = 0) and when the sum of fake poor and true poor in the 
information asymmetry case equals to the total true poor in the first-best case (i.e. 𝜋 + 𝜋 = 𝑛) 
which implies that 𝑛 = 1. However, in the asymmetry case there is a positive amount of 
unobservable income (i.e. 𝛾 > 0) that makes it difficult for the government to calculate how 
much the contribution of the benefit to the social welfare is. In turn, it is also difficult for the 
government to evaluate whether or not such benefit is cost-effective and cost-efficient in 
improving the social welfare.  
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c. Second-best case (single-signal) 
In order to mitigate the information asymmetry problem, government may find signals 
that can help distinguish applicant’s income status which then separate the types. Here, the 
model consists of a signal sender drawn from a group of applicants and a signal receiver which is 
a government. Suppose that the only signal available is electricity usage 𝑒 that represents the 
essential component and the sender is required to send that signal to the receiver. Instead of 
observing income level 𝑦, the government observes electricity usage 𝑒. Therefore, the sender 
maximizes 𝑈(𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)). Particularly, true poor maximizes 𝑈 and the fake poor maximizes 𝑈 
subject to their respective budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ +
𝑏(𝑒) = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑒𝑒, where 𝑒 is the electricity usage priced at 𝑝𝑒. Let 𝑈
𝑞 be a constant (i.e. the 
payoff from not participating). The receiver maximizes her payoff function subject to her budget 
constraint; true poor’s individual rationality (IR) constraint 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈𝑞; 
fake poor’s IR constraint 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) ≤ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞
; true poor’s incentive compatibility 
(IC) constraint 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)); and fake poor’s IC constraint 
𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) (see section c of appendix for details about the relationship 
between 𝑥′ and 𝑥). While IR constraints serve as a guarantee that participating (not participating) 
in the game will give better payoff to true poor (fake poor), IC constraints ensure that the payoff 
of each type is better when each type receives the bundle (𝑏, 𝑒) intended for that type than when 
it receives the bundle intended for the other type. However, unlike in other literatures that both 
types are better-off from participating; in this study, receiver’s objective is to make the true poor 
better-off while fake poor worse-off from participating. That said, the inequality sign in true 
poor’s IR constraint should be different from that of fake poor’s. Additionally, these constraints 
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are particularly needed when the information asymmetry is present. They help reveal the types of 
senders and characterize the separating equilibria of the signaling game model. Therefore, the 
resulting MCBs of true poor and fake poor are, respectively, given by  
𝛿4
∗ = [
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝛿1
𝜌
(
𝑃𝑒𝑏(𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝑃𝑒𝑒)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑒))
) −
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄  ]
1
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄
  
and  (3) 
𝛿4
∗ = [
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝛿1
𝜌
(
𝑃𝑒𝑏(𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝑃𝑒𝑒)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑒))
) −
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒
⁄  ]
1
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄
 ,  
where 𝛿1 is the marginal contribution of private goods consumption, 𝛿2 is the marginal 
contribution of electricity usage (see section b of appendix for details on the problem setup). The 
MCBs look tedious. However, equation (3) shows that, although the government does not have 
full information about applicant’s income, the government can use the electricity usage as the 
signal of the income level in order to determine the eligibility. That said, the government has a 
better control over the information asymmetry in this case than in the previous case. Particularly, 
although the unobservable income 𝛾 still exists in the equation, the presence of electricity usage 
is able to characterize the types of applicants and alter the overall MCBs. However, since it is not 
of interest to use a single signal in this model other than to make a comparison analysis which is 
presented in the next section, interpretation of the parameters in this equation is unnecessary. 
Now, suppose that the only signal available is required-hour. In this case, the sender 
maximizes 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)), particularly the true poor maximizes 𝑈 and the fake poor maximizes 𝑈 
subject to their respective budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) −
𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑟) = 𝑝𝑥𝑥, where 𝑟 is the required-hour valued at 𝑚. On the other hand, after 
observing 𝑟 as the only signal, the receiver maximizes her payoff function subjects to her budget 
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constraint, and the associated individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) 
constraints. The resulting MCBs of true poor and fake poor are, respectively, given by5 
𝜃3
∗ =
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜃1
𝜌(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ ) 
(
𝑚𝑏(𝑟)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑟))
)  
and  (4) 
𝜃3
∗ =
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜃1
𝜌(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ )
(
𝑚𝑏(𝑟)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑟))
). 
 The results above are somewhat surprising. After applying the assumptions in section d 
of appendix, it turns out that both MCBs have negative values. Although it is not the scope of 
this study to evaluate at what level of required-hour that results in the biggest reduction in MCB, 
the results imply that when required-hour is the only ordeal, every additional of benefits dollar 
contributes to a reduction in overall payoff of the applicant. Additionally, whether or not there is 
an inflection point that can result in a positive value of MCB is also not a scope of this study. 
 
d. Second-best case (double signals) 
Alternatively, suppose that both signals are available. The sender maximizes 
𝑈(𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)), particularly the true poor maximizes 𝑈 and the fake poor maximizes 𝑈 
subject to their respective budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) −
𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑒𝑒. On the other hand, after observing (𝑟, 𝑒), the receiver 
maximizes her payoff function subjects to her budget constraint, and the associated individual 
rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints (see section b of appendix for details 
                                                 
5 see section b of appendix for details on the problem setup 
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on the problem setup). The resulting MCBs of true poor and fake poor are, respectively, given 
by6  
𝜎4
∗ =
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ 𝑚)
  
and  (5) 
𝜎4
∗ =
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
.  
Unlike single-signal MCBs that are determined by many variables and constants, double-
signal MCBs with required-hour and electricity usage signals are only determined by marginal 
coefficient of electricity usage, per-hour opportunity cost, level of benefit, electricity usage, price 
of electricity, change of benefit given the change of time and change of benefit given the change 
of electricity usage. Given the fact that all these determinants are observable, it is easy to 
calculate and compare the MCB of both groups. If true poor’s MCB is higher than fake poor’s 
MCB, then using time and electricity usage can distinguish the types so that only one type 
receives the benefit and improve the true poor’s payoff and social welfare. Therefore, it can 
mitigate the information asymmetry. One thing worth pointing out is that by monotonicity 
assumption and single crossing condition, the separating equilibrium exists, that is, there exists 
𝑟∗ and 𝑒∗ that separates the true poor from the fake poor, so this study only focuses on analyzing 
the MCBs without necessarily showing the equilibrium existence. 
 
VI.  COMPARISON ACROSS TYPES AND CASES 
Having derived the MCBs of all different cases, the last thing to do is to see how the 
MCBs are different between types, from case to case and what explains the differences. Based on 
                                                 
6 see section b of appendix for details on the problem setup 
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the MCBs presented in section V and the assumptions in section d of appendix, the following 
evaluations are conducted to compare MCBs from different cases. The details are presented in 
section e of appendix. Since the payoff equation is a semi-log where the independent variables 
are in ln form, so as long as the MCB is greater than zero, holding others constant, an increase in 
benefit will increase the payoff at a decreasing rate. Since MCB is to show how much the payoff 
might change given one percentage change in benefit holding others constant, it is very useful for 
the government if it is concerned about the percentage change of benefit that it aims to achieve 
for the next budget allocation. The first set of evaluations is to compare true poor’s MCB to fake 
poor’s one, as follows. In information asymmetry case, it is clear that true poor’s MCB is higher 
than fake poor’s or 𝛽3
∗ > 𝛽3
∗. It is interpreted as the change in payoff of true poor is higher than 
that of fake poor as the benefit changes by one percentage holding others constant. In second-
best case (single-signal: electricity usage), whether or not true poor’s MCB 𝛿4
∗ is higher than fake 
poor’s 𝛿4
∗ depends on whether 
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒
⁄ ≥<  
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄ . To be consistent with other cases, the 
following is assumed. 
Assumption 2. Higher income individuals have lower ratio of marginal coefficient of 
electricity usage and the usage itself. 
The assumption is to ensure that, for any benefit level, true poor’s MCB is higher than 
fake poor’s. The assumption is based on the argument that fake poor are the marginal individuals 
whose income level is relatively close to the true poor’s income level. That said, there should not 
be a substantial difference between marginal coefficient of electricity usage of fake poor and of 
true poor; and between electricity usage of fake poor and true poor but the difference in 
electricity usage is large enough to offset the difference in the marginal coefficient. Since fake 
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poor’s electricity usage is higher than true poor’s so the fake poor’s ratio is smaller than the true 
poor’. Therefore, true poor’s MCB 𝛿4
∗ is higher than fake poor’s 𝛿4
∗. 
In the second-best case (single-signal: required-hour), the relationship between true 
poor’s and fake poor’s MCB is meaningless since using required-hour as the only signal would 
actually reduce the payoff as the benefit increases by one percentage point. In the second-best 
case (with double signals: electricity usage and required-hour), when single crossing condition 
for doubles signals (i.e. 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒) holds, it is obvious that true poor’s MCB is higher 
than fake poor’s or 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗. More details are presented in section f of appendix. 
The second set of evaluation is to compare the MCBs across cases. This is also to 
examine whether or not the true poor’s (fake poor’s) payoff improves (lowers) after the 
introduction of double signals. From cases comparison (section f of appendix), it is clear that true 
poor’s (fake poor’s) payoff is lower (higher) in the asymmetry case than in the first-best case. 
Furthermore, true poor’s (fake poor’s) MCB is better (lower) in the second-best case with double 
signals than in the asymmetry case. The final comparison is between the second-best case with 
double signals and a single signal. From section f of appendix, it is clear that the MCB with 
double signals is higher than MCB with required-hour as the only signal. However, to compare 
the MCB with double signals to MCB with electricity usage as the only signal, the following 
assumption is needed.  
Assumption 3. The prior probability 𝜌 that the sender is of type 𝑡 is high, that is, the 
receiver places sufficiently high probability and the cost of sending one signal should be 
substantially different from the cost of sending the other signal.  
The assumption intuitively says that given the fact that the receiver has to give benefit to 
the eligible applicants, she is likely to believe that the applicants are true poor so her prior 
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probability is high. Also, the assumption intuitively requires that the cost of sending one signal 
should be substantially higher than the cost of sending the other signal. In this case, the fact that 
the per-hour opportunity cost 𝑚 (e.g. wage rate) is substantially higher than the unit price of 
electricity usage 𝑃𝑒 satisfies the assumption. Having the assumption satisfied, it is obvious that 
the MCB with double signals is higher than the MCB with electricity usage as the only signal. 
Having analyzed and compared all cases, this study comes to form the following propositions. 
Proposition 1. Given their own characteristics, required-hour and essential component 
variables can signal the income level and, hence, government’s payoff improves when these 
variables are correlated to income without necessarily imposing any restriction on their 
correlation; and when assumption 1-3 are satisfied. 
Having derived all necessary MCBs and compared the MCBs by type and by case, the 
finding shows that using double-signal approach improves overall social welfare and maintains 
the argument that the true poor’s payoff should be higher than the fake poor’s across cases, while 
at the same time, the approach maintains the fact that all eligibility requirements are income-
related (i.e. the welfare programs are means-tested). 
Proposition 2. The result derived from the model with a single ordeal in the model will 
be highly dependent on the characteristics of the signal itself. While changing electricity usage in 
favor of true poor results in a positive MCB to true poor’s payoff, changing required-hour in 
favor of true poor results in an opposite contribution. 
When the ordeal retains the characteristics of essential component (i.e. something that an 
individual must inevitably have or cannot avoid consuming in a particular geographic area or 
shelter, the more the consumption the richer the individual is, and the consumption may reflect 
the individual’s total income e.g. electricity usage), the result shows that a reduction in the usage 
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in favor of true poor results in a positive MCB to true poor’s payoff. One the other hand, 
required-hour is associated to opportunity cost that can only reflect the labor income. So, 
required-hour may have the characteristics of labor income. The result shows that when required-
hour is included in the model, an increase in time required by government in favor of true poor, 
in fact, results in a negative MCB to true poor’s payoff. This may partly explain the reduction in 
take-up rate in many welfare benefit programs that use time as a part of the ordeals.  
Proposition 3. When required-hour and electricity usage are both included in the model 
as the ordeals, the MCB to true poor’s payoff turns out to be a positive value. 
There are two possible explanation with regard to proposition 3. Firstly, the negative 
effect shown in the result when required-hour is the only signal may be more than offset by the 
positive effect tied to the electricity usage. Secondly, when required-hour is paired with 
electricity usage as ordeals, the direction of the effect tied to required-hour changes. However, 
further research is needed to evaluate this argument. One thing worth mentioning is that although 
the result shows a positive MCB when electricity usage is the only ordeal, relying on a single 
ordeal to separate the types of applicants may not be efficient: increasing the level of ordeal to 
separate the types will be too costly to a government and, at the same time, may be too costly to 
the true poor. Therefore, having both ordeals is preferable since the cost of application may be 
well distributed across ordeals. 
Proposition 4. The benefit and the payoff received by true poor applicant are lower in the 
presence of information asymmetry than in its absence since a part of the benefit has now gone 
to fake poor. 
This is to say that when there is information asymmetry, the total benefit provided by 
government is the benefit received by the true poor 𝑏(𝑦) plus benefit received by the fake poor 
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𝑏(𝑦). This equals to the benefit received by the true poor 𝑏(𝑦) in the first-best case. Note that the 
government provides a particular amount of benefit for a particular feasible number of 
applicants. Although there are two types of applicants, the government does not divide the 
benefit based on types since it is assumed that the government does not have full information 
about applicant’s income but a portion of the benefit goes to each type. Therefore, the presence 
of information asymmetry gives incentive to the fake poor to apply for the benefit since it may 
enjoy a part of the benefit that could have been completely given to the true poor. By doing so, 
the fake poor may be better-off. This, indeed, makes the true poor applicant unhappy since a part 
of their payoff vanishes after a part of total benefit goes to the fake poor. One thing worth 
pointing out is that none of the cases presented earlier affects the total benefit: each case does not 
affect the spending allocation for the benefit but the total recipients from the true poor group. 
Although the benefit is a function of income level (in both first-best and information asymmetry 
cases) and of signals (in second-best cases), the total benefit provided by the government is not 
continuously determined by the income level or the signals. The government provides total 
benefit 𝑏 if the applicant meets the required level of income or signals and zero benefit if the 
applicant does not meet the required level. 
Proposition 5. Since for any level of benefit, true poor has higher marginal coefficient of 
benefit than fake poor, improving the true poor’s MCB while lowering the fake poor’s MCB 
significantly improves (lowers) the true poor’s (the fake poor’s) payoff which, in turn, improves 
the overall social welfare, particularly, after the introduction of double-signal approach.  
Proposition 6. There are at least three advantages of having double signals. The first is 
that electricity usage is needed to signal total income, both labor and non-labor income. 
Required-hour can only captures the labor income. The second is that because both types do not 
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have a big difference in the electricity usage, having required-hour can amplify the effect of 
signal and enhance the differences of the types. The third is that having one signal as the only 
device may not result in an efficient way to welfare benefit targeting since it may be costly to the 
applicant but does not benefit the government as much. 
 
VII.  DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the potential application of the double-signal model presented in 
this study. The importance of this model is that by using income-related variables, instead of 
income level, as the ordeals, it is expected that a government can reveal the types of the 
applicants and make truly eligible applicants (i.e. the true poor) better-off while, at the same 
time, the fake poor worse-off. This idea is applicable either in a single-period analysis when 
there is an immediate change of rule of the game (e.g. benefit requirements) made by the 
government implemented within one particular term (e.g. within the current 6-month benefit 
period) or in a multi-period analysis when the change is effective in the subsequent terms after 
the former term ends (e.g. for the next 6-month benefit periods). Practically, a government may 
either use the double-signal approach along with other screening mechanisms or use it as a stand-
alone approach. However, the advantages of having the approach in addition to other 
mechanisms are not the focus of this study. 
The model in this study is designed to be universally applicable. By universal, the 
government can use the model in any means-tested welfare programs by making some 
adjustments specific to each program. One may think of including several parameters that can 
best explain each program. However, this requires special attention, time investment and can be 
tedious: each program may have different model. Doing such may make the comparison of one 
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program to another difficult. For the sake of simplicity, another way that one can take is by 
adjusting the policy components in the model. These include adjustments in the benefit level, 
double-signal parameters, and the costs that are associated to the signals. Of course, one may 
argue that the costs are incurred by the applicants not the government. One important thing to 
note is that government may have partial controls over the costs (e.g. by requiring a particular 
amount of time required to complete the application process which then determine the costs 
associated to the time, requiring applicants to have multiple trips to welfare office, etc.). While 
the adjustments themselves should represent some of the characteristics of the programs, the 
resulting cutoffs should represent some of the programs’ eligibility requirements. Hence, the 
ability to adjust these components makes this model universally applicable. Also, one can easily 
make comparison on how effective the policy components are and evaluate at what level of 
policy components the optimal results exist.  
Additionally, the model also supports bundled programs in which if an applicant is 
eligible for program A, he/she may also be eligible for program B but not necessarily vice versa. 
In this case, the government needs to set policy components for program A based on the model 
before qualifying the applicants for program B. In other cases, the applicant’s electricity usage 
may be subsidized. Although it is not of the interest of this study, to handle this, one may need to 
include a subsidy parameter in the model, particularly let 𝑏 be a function of double signals (𝑟, 𝑒) 
and subsidy 𝑠. For example, one may have 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒 − 𝑠) for all 𝑒 > 𝑠 or 𝑏(𝑟, 0) for all 𝑒 ≤ 𝑠. Case 
𝑒 > 𝑠 implies that the applicant has more usage than what has been subsidized so that it has to 
pay the extra usage. Having 𝑒 > 𝑠 may lower the second argument of 𝑏. Case 𝑒 ≤ 𝑠 implies that 
the household’s usage is fully paid by the subsidy. So, assuming non-negativity, if 𝑒 ≤ 𝑠 then 
𝑒 − 𝑠 = 0, which is the lowest value of the second argument of 𝑏. Therefore both cases may 
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increase the likelihood of the applicants to receive the benefits. The arguments are that those who 
have been eligible and receiving the electricity subsidy for the poor should also be eligible for 
the welfare program; and that it is to guarantee that if the applicant is revealed as poor in subsidy 
program, he/she is likely to be revealed as poor in the welfare program so that there is a 
consistency in defining the poor across means-tested programs. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study examines the performance of double-signal approach in mitigating the 
information asymmetry between applicants and government and improving the social welfare. 
Applicants consist of two types, namely, truly eligible applicants (i.e. true poor) and truly 
ineligible applicants (i.e. fake poor). Particularly, this study investigates how the approach 
affects the contribution of benefit to the payoff function while keeping the other variables 
unchanged. However, rather than looking at the changes of total payoff, this study is looking at 
the changes in marginal coefficient of benefit (MCB). Practically, this study compares the MCB 
in four cases, namely, first-best case, information asymmetry case, second-best case with single-
signal and second-best case with double signals. True poor and fake poor are different in 
characteristics and upon these differences some assumptions (listed in section d of appendix) 
necessary for the equilibria are made. The analyses begin with comparing the fake poor’s MCB 
to true poor’s MCB. The final analysis compares the MCB of a particular type across cases.  
As shown earlier, the presence of information asymmetry (IA) lowers (raises) the true 
poor’s (fake poor’s) payoff that is higher (lower) in the absence of it (i.e. in the first-best case 
FB). Particularly, the resulting payoff of true poor is 𝑈𝐼𝐴 (𝑦) < 𝑈𝐹𝐵 (𝑦) and of fake poor is 
𝑈𝐼𝐴(𝑦) > 𝑈𝐹𝐵(𝑦). Consequently, since the government has utilitarian social welfare function, 
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social welfare is then 𝑊𝐼𝐴(𝑦) < 𝑊𝐹𝐵(𝑦). This study then shows how to improve the applicant’s 
payoff as well as the social welfare through the introduction of double signals in the second-best 
(SB) case. The result shows that, although the payoff of true poor and the social welfare in the 
second-best case are lower than in the first-best case, they are higher than that in information 
asymmetry case. Particularly, the payoff of true poor 𝑈𝑆𝐵(𝑟, 𝑒), fake poor 𝑈𝑆𝐵(𝑟, 𝑒) and the 
social welfare 𝑊𝑆𝐵(𝑟, 𝑒) are given by 𝑈𝐹𝐵 (𝑦) > 𝑈𝑆𝐵(𝑟, 𝑒) > 𝑈𝐼𝐴 (𝑦), 𝑈𝐹𝐵(𝑦) < 𝑈𝑆𝐵(𝑟, 𝑒) <
𝑈𝐼𝐴(𝑦) and 𝑊𝐹𝐵(𝑦) > 𝑊𝑆𝐵(𝑟, 𝑒) > 𝑊𝐼𝐴(𝑦) respectively. 
Furthermore, there are important points worth commenting. Firstly, in the absence of 
information asymmetry (i.e. from the first-best case), the benefit is only given to the true poor as 
much as 𝑏(𝑦)∗ =
𝛽3
𝛽1
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ (
𝑃𝑔𝐺
𝑛
−𝜑−𝑚ℎ)
(1−𝜏)
. In the presence of information asymmetry, the benefit 
received by the true poor is 𝑏(𝑦)∗ =
𝛽3
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ [
𝑃𝑔𝐺
𝜋
−(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−
𝜋
𝜋
(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))]
𝛽1(1−𝜏)
. Note that 𝑛 
in the first-best case is the total of true poor applicants, so it is equivalent to 𝜋 in information 
asymmetry case. That said, it is clear that the benefit received by true poor applicant is lower in 
the presence of information asymmetry than in its absence since a part of 𝑏(𝑦) has now gone to 
the fake poor as much as 𝑏(𝑦). When there is information asymmetry the total benefit provided 
by government is 𝑏(𝑦) + 𝑏(𝑦) which is equal to 𝑏(𝑦), total benefit in the first-best case. Hence, 
information asymmetry does not affect the total means-tested benefit provided by government. 
Secondly, the presence of information asymmetry gives incentive to the fake poor to apply for 
the benefit since the fake poor may enjoy a part of the benefit that could have been completely 
given to the true poor. By doing so, the fake poor is better-off while the true poor is worse-off. 
Thirdly, double-signal approach does not affect the total benefit since the information asymmetry 
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does not affect the spending allocation for the benefit but the total recipient from the true poor 
group. This approach helps government address the symmetry issue since the signals are 
characterized by costs that are different between fake and true poor. Fourthly, since for any level 
of benefit, true poor has higher MCB than the fake poor, improving the true poor’s MCB while 
lowering the fake poor’s MCB significantly improves (lowers) true poor’s (fake poor’s) payoff 
which, in turn, improves the overall social welfare, particularly, after the introduction of double-
signal approach. Additionally, there are at least three advantages of having double signals. The 
first is that electricity usage is needed to signal total income which includes non-labor and labor 
incomes since required-hour only indirectly captures the labor income. The second is that 
because both types do not have big difference in the electricity usage so required-hour can be 
used to amplify the effect of signal since it can add to the differences between types. The third is 
that having one signal as the only device may not result in an efficient way to welfare benefit 
targeting since it is costly to the applicant and does not benefit the government as much. Further 
research is necessary to understand how to design an application process so that time can also be 
a powerful device since, regardless the ways of applications, time is something that an individual 
always spends. For example, what tool can be tied to time and is highly dependent on time that 
government can use as a bundled device? How to transparently communicate the ordeals and the 
cutoff levels to the eligible individuals so that they may not scare applicants away but attract 
more sign-ups? Can communication be augmented to one of the ordeals to make the ordeals 
more efficient ways in improving benefit targeting? Answers to these questions may be 
important outcomes of future research. More research is also needed to examine which of 
essential components’ characteristics (i.e. either something that an individual must inevitably 
have or cannot avoid consuming in a particular geographic area or shelter, the more the 
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consumption the richer the individual is, the consumption may reflects the individual’s total 
income, or any combination of them) that contributes to a positive MCB to true poor’s payoff.  
APPENDIX 
a. Note on Assumption 1.  
Assumption 1 says that the signals are strictly monotone and continuous. That is, signal 𝑒 
is strictly increasing while signal 𝑟 is strictly decreasing in 𝑡. Notice that equilibrium requires 
that type 𝑡 prefers [𝑟 = 𝑟(𝑡), 𝑒 = 𝑒(𝑡)] to [?̅? = 𝑟(𝑡̅), ?̅? = 𝑒(𝑡̅)] which then concludes the 
monotonicity property, that is, 𝑟 > ?̅? if 𝑡 < 𝑡̅ and ?̅? > 𝑒 if 𝑡̅ > 𝑡7. If strategies were not strictly 
increasing, there would be an atom at some, say, 𝑒 > 0, that is, an 𝑒 such that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑒𝑗(𝑡𝑗) =
𝑒) > 0. Then, player 𝑖 would assign probability 0 to the interval [𝑒 − 𝜀, 𝑒) for 𝜀 small, as she is 
better off with just above 𝑒. Therefore, the types of player 𝑗 that chooses 𝑒 would be better off 
with 𝑠 − 𝜀, since this would not reduce the probability of getting the benefit and would lead to 
reduced cost of signaling. So there cannot be an atom at 𝑒 after all. On the other hand, if the 
strategies were not continuous, then there would be an 𝑒′ ≥ 0 and an 𝑒′′ > 𝑒′ such that 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑒𝑗(𝑡𝑗) ∈ [𝑒
′, 𝑒′′]) = 0 while 𝑒𝑗(?̂?𝑗) = 𝑒
′′ + 𝜀 for some small 𝜀 ≤ 0 for some ?̂?𝑗. Then, 
player 𝑖 strictly prefers 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑠′ to any 𝑠𝑖 ∈ (𝑠
′, 𝑠′′), as the probability of getting the benefit is the 
same and the expected cost is reduced. But then quitting at or just beyond 𝑒′′ is not optimal for 
player 𝑗 with type ?̂?𝑗. 
 
                                                 
7 More details about these properties are explained by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 217-218). 
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b. Summary of Magnitude Coefficients of Benefit (MCB) 
The following lists the applicant’s problems, the government’s problems, and the 
magnitude coefficients of benefit (MCB) of the first-best, the information asymmetry and the 
second-best cases (with single and double signals): 
 
1. First-best case 
In this case, government has full information about the types and gives the benefit to the 
true poor only, so the true poor maximizes its payoff function 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑦)) = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑙 +
𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑦) subjects to their budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝐻 + 𝑏(𝑦) = (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝑙 +
𝑝𝑥𝑥, where 𝐻 = 𝑙 + ℎ; (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝐻 − (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝑙 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 is total income which 
is the sum of labor and non-labor income; and 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 1. Government is assumed to 
know (1 − 𝜏)𝑦. On the other hand, government maximizes its payoff function which is the social 
welfare function 𝑊 = 𝑊(𝐺, 𝑏(𝑦)) = ∑ 𝑈𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1  subjects to 𝑛𝜏𝑚ℎ + 𝑛𝜏𝜑 = 𝑃𝑔𝐺 + 𝑛𝑏(𝑦). Taking 
the first derivative of 𝑊 with respect to 𝜏 and 𝑦, the MCB is 
𝛽3
∗ =
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ (
𝑃𝑔𝐺
𝑛
−𝜑−𝑚ℎ)
  
 
2. Information asymmetry case 
In this case, government cannot distinguish the types of applicants, so both types 
maximize their payoff function 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑦)) = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑦). Particularly, the true 
poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 and the fake poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 subjects to their respective 
budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑦) = 𝑝𝑥𝑥, where 𝐻 =
𝑙 + ℎ; 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 1 and 𝑦
′ = (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ =
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(1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚ℎ + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ is the total income which is the 
sum of the first-best total income and the missing potential tax liabilities, 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ. Thus, 
government is assumed to incompletely observe the total income (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝐻 −
(1 − 𝜏)𝑚𝑙 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 which is the sum of labor and non-labor income. Applicants make a 
portion of income 𝛾 unobservable (e.g. by not reporting it to the government), so government can 
only observe (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) and (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑). Therefore, government maximizes its payoff function 
𝑊 = 𝑊(𝐺, 𝑏(𝑦)) = 𝜌𝑈(. ) + (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(. ) subjects to 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) −
𝑏(𝑦)) + 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦)) − 𝑃𝑔𝐺 ≥ 0, where 𝜋 and 𝜋 = 1 − 𝜋 are the 
proportions of the true and fake poor applicants. Taking the first derivatives of 𝑊 with respect to 
𝜏, 𝜏, 𝑦, and 𝑦, the MCBs are 
𝛽3
∗ =
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾
ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))]
  
and  
𝛽3
∗ =
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))]
  
 
3. Second-best case (single signal: electricity usage) 
In order to mitigate the information asymmetry problem, government can use information 
about applicant’s electricity usage to distinguish the types. Hence, both types of applicants 
account their electricity usage in their payoff functions. Both types maximize 𝑈(𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) =
𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑒). Particularly, the true poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 and the 
fake poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 subjects to their respective budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 −
𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑒) = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑒𝑒, where 𝐻 = 𝑙 + ℎ; 𝛿1 + 𝛿2 + 𝛿3 +
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𝛿4 = 1; 𝑦
′ = (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚ℎ +
𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ is the total income which is the sum of the first-best total 
income and the missing potential tax liabilities, 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ. Government maximizes its payoff 
function 𝑊 = 𝑊(𝐺, 𝑏(𝑒)) = 𝜌𝑈(. ) + (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(. ) subjects to 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) −
𝑏(𝑒)) + 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑒)) − 𝑃𝑔𝐺 ≥ 0; IR1. 𝑈 (𝑥
′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) = 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ +
𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑒) ≥ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞; IR2. 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) = 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑙 +
𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑒) ≤ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞
; IC1. 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) = 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑒 +
𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑒); IC2. 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑒)) = 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑙 +
𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑒), where 𝑈
𝑞 and 𝑈
𝑞
 are constants and 𝜌 is the probability that the applicant is a true poor 
individual. IR constraint is to ensure that the payoff from applying should be at least as high as 
that from not applying in order to encourage the true poor to participate in the welfare program, 
while it is the opposite for the fake poor. IR1 and IC2 constraints are binding while IR2 and IC1 
are not binding (i.e. setting lagrange multipliers associated to IR2 and IC1 equal to 0 and to IR1 
and IC2 equal to positive values). Taking the first derivatives of 𝑊 with respect to 𝜏, 𝜏, 𝑒, and 𝑒, 
the MCBs are 
𝛿4
∗ = [
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝛿1
𝜌
(
𝑃𝑒𝑏(𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝑃𝑒𝑒)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑒))
) −
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄  ]
1
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄
  
and 
𝛿4
∗ = [
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝛿1
𝜌
(
𝑃𝑒𝑏(𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝑃𝑒𝑒)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑒))
) −
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒
⁄  ]
1
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄
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4. Second-best case (single signal: required-hour) 
Alternatively, as many literatures suggested, government can use information about 
applicants’ time (i.e. required-hour) since it is associated to different values of time placed by the 
applicants. The values are based on their hourly wage. However, as shown later, using required-
hour as the only requirement will not increase the overall social welfare. To show this, it is 
assumed that both types of applicants account their time in their payoff functions. Both types 
maximize 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜃1𝑙𝑛𝑥 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟). Particularly, the true poor applicant 
maximizes 𝑈 and the fake poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 subjects to their respective budget 
constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑟) = 𝑝𝑥𝑥, where 
𝐻 = 𝑙 + ℎ + 𝑟; 𝜃1 + 𝜃2 + 𝜃3 = 1; 𝑦
′ = (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ =
(1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚ℎ + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ is the total income which is the 
sum of the first-best total income and the missing potential tax liabilities, 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ. 
Government maximizes its payoff function 𝑊 = 𝑊(𝐺, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜌𝑈(. ) + (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(. ) subjects 
to 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟)) + 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) +
𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟)) − 𝑃𝑔𝐺 ≥ 0; IR1. 𝑈 (𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜃1𝑙𝑛𝑥 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟) ≥ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) =
𝑈𝑞; IR2. 𝑈 (𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜃1𝑙𝑛𝑥 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟) ≤ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞
; IC1. 𝑈 (𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) ≥
𝑈 (𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜃1𝑙𝑛𝑥 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟); IC2. 𝑈 (𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜃1𝑙𝑛𝑥 +
𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟), where 𝑈
𝑞 and 𝑈
𝑞
 are constants and 𝜌 is the probability that the applicant is a 
true poor individual. IR constraint is to ensure that the payoff from applying should be at least as 
high as that from not applying in order to encourage the true poor to participate in the welfare 
program, while it is the opposite for the fake poor. IR1 and IC2 constraints are binding while IR2 
and IC1 are not binding (i.e. setting lagrange multipliers associated to IR2 and IC1 equal to 0 and 
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to IR1 and IC2 equal to positive values). Taking the first derivatives of 𝑊 with respect to 𝜏, 𝜏, 𝑟, 
and 𝑟, the MCBs are 
𝜃3
∗ =
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜃1
𝜌(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ ) 
(
𝑚𝑏(𝑟)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑟))
)  
and 
𝜃3
∗ =
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜃1
𝜌(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ )
(
𝑚𝑏(𝑟)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑟))
)  
 
5. Second-best (double signals: electricity usage and required-hour) 
As proposed in this study, government can use information about both applicant’s 
electricity usage and time (i.e. required-hour). As shown in the comparison section, this 
information helps government distinguish the types and enhance social welfare. Both types 
maximize 𝑈(𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒). Particularly, the true 
poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 and the fake poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 subjects to their respective 
budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) =
𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑒𝑒, where 𝐻 = 𝑙 + ℎ + 𝑟; 𝜎1 + 𝜎2 + 𝜎3 + 𝜎4 = 1; 𝑦
′ = (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 +
(1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚ℎ + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ is 
the total income which is the sum of the first-best total income and the missing potential tax 
liabilities, 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ. Government maximizes its payoff function 𝑊 = 𝑊(𝐺, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) =
𝜌𝑈(. ) + (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(. ) subjects to 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) +
𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) − 𝑃𝑔𝐺 ≥ 0; IR1. 𝑈 (𝑥
′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) =
𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) ≥ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞; IR2. 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ +
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𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) ≤ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞
; IC1. 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) =
𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒); IC2. 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ +
𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒), where 𝑈
𝑞 and 𝑈
𝑞
 are constants and 𝜌 is the probability that the 
applicant is a true poor applicant. IR constraint is to ensure that the payoff from applying should 
be at least as high as that from not applying in order to encourage the true poor to participate in 
the welfare program, while it is the opposite for the fake poor. IR1 and IC2 constraints are 
binding while IR2 and IC1 are not binding (i.e. setting lagrange multipliers associated to IR2 and 
IC1 equal to 0 and to IR1 and IC2 equal to positive values). Taking the first derivatives of 𝑊 
with respect to 𝜏, 𝜏, 𝑒, 𝑒, 𝑟, and 𝑟, the MCBs are 
𝜎4
∗ =
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ 𝑚)
  
and 
𝜎4
∗ =
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
  
 
c. The Relationship between 𝑥′ and 𝑥 
To see this, let 𝑋 be the total value of consumption, that is, 𝑋 = 𝑝𝑥𝑥. Also, let 𝑋 =
𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑥′′𝑥
′′ + 𝑝𝑥′′′𝑥
′′′ + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑥𝑘𝑥
𝑘 so that 𝑝𝑥𝑥 = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑥′′𝑥
′′ + 𝑝𝑥′′′𝑥
′′′ + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑥𝑘𝑥
𝑘. 
Lastly, let 𝑥′′ be the electricity usage and 𝑥′′′, … , 𝑥𝑘 = 0 so that one can write 𝑋 = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑒𝑒. 
That said, one can also write 𝑈(𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙) = 𝑈(𝑋, 𝑙) = 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙). 
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d. Assumptions for Variables and Changes of the Variables 
In finding the equilibria, it is important to describe the required assumptions with regard 
to the variables used. The assumptions are based on the characteristics of each type, as follows: 
a1) 𝑛 is total proportion of applicants which consists of only true poor applicants in the first-best 
case. In cases other than the first-best, 𝑛 consists of a proportion of true poor applicants 𝜋 and 
fake poor applicants 𝜋 where 𝜋 ≥ 𝜋. a2) 𝑚ℎ > 𝑚ℎ. a3) 𝜑 ≥ 𝜑. a4) The unobservable labor 
income portion: 𝛾ℎ > 𝛾ℎ. a5) The unobservable non-labor income portion: 𝛾𝜑 ≥ 𝛾𝜑. a6) 𝜏 ≥ 𝜏. 
a7) 𝑏(𝑦) ≤ 𝑏(𝑦) (i.e. 𝑏(𝑦) = 𝑏(𝑦) under information asymmetry case and 𝑏(. ) < 𝑏(. ) under 
second-best case). a8) 𝑒 > 𝑒. a9) 𝑟 < 𝑟. a10) 𝑚 > 𝑚. a11) 𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ ≥ 𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ (if fake poor 
takes out a portion to make them eligible for the benefit then fake poor income may be similar to 
that of true poor). a12) 𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑 ≥ 𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑. a13) 𝜏(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) ≥ 𝜏(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ). a14) 𝜏(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) ≥
𝜏(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑). a15) 𝜋(𝑚ℎ + 𝜑) > 𝜋(𝑚ℎ + 𝜑) under information asymmetry. a16) 
 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) +  𝜏(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑)) ≥ 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑)) under information 
asymmetry by assuming that fake poor is not likely to reduce the income to be eligible since 
government is unable to observe the income which makes the after tax evading income of fake 
poor is bigger than that of true poor. a17) 𝜋(𝑚ℎ + 𝜑) ≤ 𝜋(𝑚ℎ + 𝜑) under the second-best case 
by assuming that the difference in total applicants between fake and true poor is able to 
compensate the difference in income between them. a18)  𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) +  𝜏(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑)) ≤
𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑)) under the second-best case by assuming that the difference in 
total applicants between fake and true poor is able to compensate the difference in income 
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between them. a19) 𝛿2 ≥ 𝛿2 and 𝜎2 ≥ 𝜎2 under the second-best case since fake poor who are 
richer than the true poor might have more electronic devices than the true poor which makes 
their utility increase in these devices. a20) 
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒
⁄ ≥<  
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄  since fake and true poor 
might not have big difference in income due to the fact that fake poor are marginal individuals, 
so their electricity usage might be slightly higher than the true. a21) 𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝑃𝑒𝑒 ≥ 𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ −
𝑃𝑒𝑒. a22) 𝜋 (𝜏𝑚ℎ − 𝜏𝛾
ℎ + 𝜏𝜑 − 𝜏𝛾𝜑) + 𝜋(𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝑃𝑒𝑒) < 𝜋 (𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝑃𝑒𝑒) +
𝜋 (𝜏𝑚ℎ − 𝜏𝛾ℎ + 𝜏𝜑 −  𝜏𝛾𝜑). a23) 𝜋 (𝜏𝑚ℎ − 𝜏𝛾ℎ + 𝜏𝜑 − 𝜏𝛾𝜑) + 𝜋(𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ) <
𝜋 (𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ) + 𝜋 (𝜏𝑚ℎ − 𝜏𝛾ℎ + 𝜏𝜑 −  𝜏𝛾𝜑). a24) 𝜌𝜖[0,1). a25) From budget constraint of 
information asymmetry case, one may have 𝑃𝑔𝐺 − 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦)) =
𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦)) or 𝑃𝑔𝐺 − 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾
ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦)) =
𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦)) which concludes that i) 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) +
𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦)) − 𝜋 (𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ) < 0 and ii) 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦)) −
𝜋(𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ) < 0 and since the fake poor reduces much more income than the true poor due to 
their evading behavior and the fake poor have more actual income 𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ than the true poor, so 
ii < i or |ii| > |i|. a26) From budget constraint of the second-best case with one signal (electricity 
usage), one may have i) 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑒)) − 𝜋 (𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝑃𝑒𝑒) < 0 and 
ii) 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑒)) − 𝜋(𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝑃𝑒𝑒) < 0. To compare i to ii, I need 
to assume that the difference between 𝑏(𝑒) and 𝑏(𝑒) is not sufficient enough to offset the 
difference between the fake poor’s the taxed evading income – the actual income gap and the 
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true poor’s one and that the difference between 𝜋 and 𝜋 is not sufficient enough to make i > ii 
since the purpose of having the second-best case is to differentiate the types but not to directly 
affect the proportion of fake and true poor’s number of applicants. Therefore, the assumption 
allows one to have i > ii or |i| < |ii|. a27) Analogous to a26, one may have i) 𝜋(𝜏) − 𝜋(. ) < 0 and 
ii) 𝜋(𝜏) − 𝜋(. ) < 0. It is also assumed that i > ii or |i| < |ii|. a28) in order to focus on the 
differences between the magnitude coefficient of benefit across cases, it is assumed that fake 
poor’s magnitude coefficient of private consumption 𝑥 equals to that of true poor’s which is 1 
(e.g. in information asymmetry case, 𝛽1 = 𝛽1 = 1). 
The assumptions needed with regard to the changes of variables are as follows: b1) 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ < 0,
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦
⁄ < 0,
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ < 0. b2) 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦
⁄ >
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄  or |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦
⁄ | < |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ |. b3) 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ >
0, 𝜕
2𝑏
𝜕𝑟2⁄ < 0. b4) 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ >
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄  which is due to the fact that because fake poor can only 
provide little time for the application process so they are far from being eligible. Therefore, by 
assuming continuity and by b3, adding more time will increase the benefit substantially. b5) 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ < 0. b6) 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ <
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄  or |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ | > |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ |. 
 
e. Magnitude Coefficient of Benefit (MCB) Comparison of Types 
The following comparison is based on the MCBs presented in section b of appendix and 
assumptions from section d of appendix: 
1. For information asymmetry case. By only accounting a7, 𝛽3
∗ = 𝛽3
∗; by only accounting 
a6, 𝛽3
∗ ≥ 𝛽3
∗; by only accounting b2 and a25, 𝛽3
∗ > 𝛽3
∗. However, by accounting all, true 
poor’s MCB is higher than fake poor’s. It is interpreted as the change in payoff of true 
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poor is higher than that of fake poor as the benefit changes by one percentage holding 
others constant.  
2. For second-best case (single-signal: electricity usage). By a1, 𝛿4
∗ ≥ 𝛿4
∗; by a7, 𝛿4
∗ > 𝛿4
∗; 
by b6 and a26, 𝛿4
∗ > 𝛿4
∗; by a19, 𝛿4
∗ > 𝛿4
∗; by a20, 𝛿4
∗ ≥< 𝛿4
∗. Overall, if a20 is 
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄ >
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒
⁄  , then 𝛿4
∗ > 𝛿4
∗. Alternatively, although 
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄ <
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒
⁄  but 
the difference is offset by the differences of the first term of equation 𝛿4
∗ then  𝛿4
∗ > 𝛿4
∗. 
Likewise, if 
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄ =
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒
⁄ , then 𝛿4
∗ > 𝛿4
∗. 
3. For second-best case (single-signal: required-hour). By a1, 𝜃3
∗ ≥ 𝜃3
∗; by a7, 𝜃3
∗ > 𝜃3
∗; by 
a7 and a10, it may be that 𝜃3
∗ < 𝜃3
∗. However, if the difference between 𝑚 and 𝑚 is offset 
by the difference between 𝑏 and 𝑏, it may be that 𝜃3
∗ > 𝜃3
∗. By b4, 𝜃3
∗ > 𝜃3
∗, but by b4 and 
a27, 𝜃3
∗ < 𝜃3
∗. Note that by a27, 𝜃3
∗, 𝜃3
∗ < 0 and 𝜃3
∗ < 𝜃3
∗which theoretically do not make 
sense. Therefore, this proves that using required-hour as the only signal would actually 
reduce the payoff as the benefit increases by one percentage point.  
4. Second-best case (double signals: electricity usage and required-hour). By a19, 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗ 
but by not much since fake poor are just the marginal individuals whose income levels 
are close to true poor’s ones. So the difference in payoff due to difference in electricity 
may not be so huge. By a7, 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗; by a7, a19 and a10, 𝜎4
∗ ≥< 𝜎4
∗. However, if the 
difference in 𝑏(. ) between fake and true poor can offset difference in both 𝜎2 and 𝑚 
between fake and true poor, then 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗. By a8, 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗; by b4, b6 and a10, 𝜎4
∗ ≥< 𝜎4
∗. 
That is, 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗ if the difference in 𝑚 between fake and true poor can offset the 
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difference between 𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒 −
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄  between both types such that it would result in 
high denominator of equation 𝜎4
∗ while low denominator of 𝜎4
∗. But if both signals could 
help distinguish the types, so 𝑏(. ) = 0 and 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗. However, if one looks at the 
denominator of equation 𝜎4
∗, one may see that, indeed, 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗ due to b4, b6 and a10 
which gives bigger denominator of equation 𝜎4
∗ than 𝜎4
∗. This also applies to all second-
best cases. It is also worth mentioning that equation 𝜎4
∗ clearly shows that both signals 
have important role through 𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑒⁄  and 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ .  
In a model with a single signal, single crossing condition holds if the true poor sends 
more signals to induce increases in the response (i.e. the benefit) since the cost of sending the 
signal of true poor is less than that of the fake poor. Given the fact that the initial endowments 
𝑟0and 𝑒0 of both types are such that 𝑟
0
< 𝑟0 and 𝑒
0
> 𝑒0, when required-hour (electricity usage) 
is the only signal, true poor is willing to increase (decrease) more required-hours (electricity 
usage) than the fake poor. This implies that the fake poor’s indifference curve is steeper than that 
of true poor, i.e. 𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑟
⁄ >
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄  and 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ <
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄  in negative values or in absolute values. 
The latter is equivalent to |𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑒
⁄ | > |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ |. This is illustrated in the following figures. 
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Figure 1. Single Crossing Condition 
 
In double-signal model, the conditions that 𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑟
⁄ >
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄  and |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ | > |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ | 
should also hold since the assumption that the cost of sending the signal of true poor is less than 
that of the fake poor still holds. As a result, it is clear that the denominator of 𝜎4
∗ is bigger than 
that of 𝜎4
∗. Therefore, at any benefit level, the difference between 𝑚 and 𝑚 in the numerators 
such that 𝑚 < 𝑚 should be offset by the difference of the denominators such that 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗ holds.  
Now, applying the single crossing condition for double-signal model such that 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 >
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 or |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄
| > |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄
| implies either 𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑟
⁄ >
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄  or |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ | < |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ |. The former 
also holds in the single signal model when required-hour is the only signal. The latter, however, 
does not hold in the single signal model. Note that, unlike in traditional models that MRS is 
strictly decreasing in type, this model imposes that it is strictly increasing in type since the type 
of interest is the lower type (those with lower income). The single signal model assumes that 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ <
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄  which the values are negative, or in absolute values, it is |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ | > |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ |. 
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Therefore, for 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 to hold, the assumption that 
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ >
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄  should hold. It 
also requires either the value of 𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑟
⁄  be sufficiently large enough to offset the value of |𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑒
⁄ | 
which is bigger than |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ | or the value of |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ | be sufficiently small enough. However, the 
former seems to work better than the latter since, with the latter, if |𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑒
⁄ | is sufficiently small 
enough, the condition |𝜕𝑏 𝜕𝑒
⁄ | > |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ | may bring the value of |
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ | even lower and 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 even bigger. That said, with the former, the single crossing condition increases the 
likelihood that 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗.  
Another important thing that one may be interested is to look at the marginal payoff of 
the benefit (MPB) to see how big the contribution of every dollar of benefit to the overall payoff 
is. In doing so, taking the total differential of the payoff with respect to the benefit 𝑑𝑈 𝑑𝑏⁄  and 
setting 𝑏(. ) = 𝑏, one may get 𝑀𝐶𝐵 𝑏⁄ . Therefore, to get the MPB, one may divide all MCBs 
listed earlier with the associated benefit 𝑏. The result is still consistent with the MCB comparison 
above. 
 
f. Cases Comparison 
This comparison is to evaluate whether or not there is a reduction in social welfare at the 
presence of information asymmetry; whether the introduction of a signal results in a better social 
welfare than it is under information asymmetry; and whether the introduction of double signals 
outperform the single signal’s effect on social welfare. 
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1. The first comparison is to see whether true poor’s MCB is higher in the first-best case 
than it is in the presence of information asymmetry and whether fake poor’s MCB is 
higher in the presence of information asymmetry than it is in the first-best case. The idea 
is that when government has full information (i.e. in the first-best case) about types, it 
only provides benefits to the true poor but when it does not have full information, it gives 
benefits to both true and fake poor. This results in a lower MCB of true poor but a higher 
MCB of fake poor in the presence of information asymmetry than in the absence of it (i.e. 
in the first-best case). The following is comparing the MCB in the first-best case to true 
poor’s MCB in the presence of information asymmetry, i.e. comparing 𝛽3
∗ to 𝛽3
∗ (note 
that, in this case, all variables 𝑣 = 𝑣): 
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ (
𝑃𝑔𝐺
𝑛
−𝜑−𝑚ℎ)
≥<
𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾
ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))]
. After some algebra simplifications, one 
may have 𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ > 𝜏 (𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑦). So it proves that 𝛽3
∗ > 𝛽3
∗. 
Note that the right hand side is the fake poor’s income after being reduced by 𝛾 and being 
taxed by 𝜏 subtracted by the benefit 𝑏(𝑦) while the left hand side is the true poor’s full 
income. Automatically, since the true poor’s MCB decreases in the presence of 
information asymmetry, the fake poor’s MCB increases in the presence of it since they 
could not get any benefit in the first-best case. 
2. The second comparison is between the second-best case with double signals and the 
information asymmetry case to see if true poor’s MCB improves in the second-best case 
while the fake poor’s MCB gets lower. That is, comparing 𝛽3
∗ to 𝜎4
∗ and 𝛽3
∗ to 𝜎4
∗ and 
assuming that 𝑏(𝑦) = 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒). Between 𝛽3
∗ and 𝜎4
∗, one may have 
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𝑏(𝑦)𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾
ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))]
≥<
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ 𝑚)
. After some algebra 
manipulation, one may have 
𝛽1(1−𝜏)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑦⁄ [𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾
ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑦))−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ)]
<
𝜎2𝑚
𝑒(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ 𝑚)
.  Since 𝜋 has a big value, it is believed that 𝛽3
∗ < 𝜎4
∗. Now, the 
comparison is between 𝛽3
∗ and 𝜎4
∗. Recall that from previous section, 𝛽3
∗ > 𝛽3
∗. After 
mitigating the information asymmetry using double signals, the difference in marginal 
coefficient of benefit widens since it is expected that true poor’s coefficient gets higher in 
the second-best case with double signals than in information asymmetry case while fake 
poor’s coefficient gets lower. That said, since 𝜎4
∗ > 𝛽3
∗ > 𝛽3
∗ and 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗ by much, one 
may have 𝛽3
∗ > 𝜎4
∗ which shows that fake poor’s coefficient lowers in the second-best 
case. However, this inequality only exists when the difference between 𝜎4
∗ and 𝜎4
∗ should 
be significantly bigger than the difference between 𝛽3
∗ and 𝜎4
∗, regardless the size of the 
difference between 𝛽3
∗ and 𝛽3
∗. 
3. The third comparison is to see if true poor’s MCB in the second-best case with double 
signals is better than it is with single signal, while the fake may be lower in the second-
best case with double signals than it is with single signal. Here, it is assumed that 𝑏(𝑒) =
𝑏(𝑟) = 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒), while 𝑏(𝑒) ≠ 𝑏(𝑟) ≠ 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) since if the applicant is a true poor then he 
will get the same amount of benefit regardless the case but it does not apply to the fake 
poor since it depends on government’s information endowment. 
- Comparing MCB with two signals to MCB with single signal (electricity usage). 
Comparing 𝛿4
∗ to 𝜎4
∗, one may have 
47 
 
[
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝛿1
𝜌
(
𝑃𝑒𝑏(𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝑃𝑒𝑒)−𝜋(𝜏(𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)+𝜏(𝜑− 𝛾𝜑)−𝑏(𝑒))
) −
𝛿2𝑏(𝑒)
𝑒⁄  ]
1
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄
≥<
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ 𝑚)
. Now, when government can distinguish the type, 𝜌 ∈ [0,1) may 
take the highest possible value which results in a low value of 
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝛿1
𝜌
 and a 
likelihood that the left-hand side is lower than the right-hand side, that is, 𝛿4
∗ < 𝜎4
∗. 
Particularly, since it is likely that 𝑚 > 𝑃𝑒 and that denominator in the left-hand side is 
bigger than that in the right-hand side, it is likely that 𝛿4
∗ < 𝜎4
∗. To be precise, an 
empiric analysis may convey more information about this comparison. Analogously, 
it is likely that 𝛿4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗. 
- Next is to compare MCB with double signals to MCB with a single signal (required-
hour), that is comparing 𝜃3
∗ to 𝜎4
∗ and 𝜃3
∗ to 𝜎4
∗. Since 𝜃3
∗ and 𝜃3
∗ are both negative 
values so 𝜃3
∗ < 𝜎4
∗ and 𝜃3
∗ < 𝜎4
∗. However, as proven earlier, 𝜎4
∗ > 𝜎4
∗ then it is clear 
that although it looks like the payoffs of both types improve but since the true poor 
have higher MCB than the fake poor (which possibly by substantial amount, 
especially when 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) = 0) then double signals really improves the overall social 
welfare. 
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CHAPTER 2 INTER-JURISDICTIONAL AND DYNAMIC INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
WITHIN WELFARE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After President Clinton signed the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (i.e. Welfare Reform Act of 1996), each state received block grants from 
federal government to operate its own welfare and work programs. This reform gave flexibilities 
to each state in designing the eligibility and the requirements.8 These flexibilities led to the first 
of two differentials that would be discussed in this paper: cross-border welfare cost and benefit 
differentials (hereafter jurisdiction differential).9 Although the welfare benefit might be the same 
across individuals from the same income group and household size, the cost to get the benefit 
might be different. This differential induced ineligible individuals to engage in a strategic 
behavior to qualify for the benefits: migration. Individuals migrated to, say, jurisdiction B that 
offered more net benefit and weaker requirements than jurisdiction A. This behavior could create 
problems including poor concentration and information asymmetry in jurisdiction B. The 
information asymmetry problem arose from the inability of government to observe the complete 
information about individuals’ income.  
                                                 
8 For example, each state is flexible in designing the time-limit policies that restrict the periods of receiving benefits, 
and in establishing family caps in order to prevent mothers of babies born from receiving additional benefits while 
they are still on welfare (as discussed in Bloom, Farrell, Fink, and Adams-Ciardullo (1999); Farrell, Rich, Turner, 
Seith, and Bloom (2008)). Additionally, due to a memo released in 2013 by Department of Health and Human 
Services, states are allowed to provide assistance without having to enforce the work component of the program if 
they are able to find credible ways to increase employment by twenty percent (based on the article "Endangered 
Welfare Reform" by Kay S. Hymowitz. City Journal, July 22, 2012. Accessed on December 18, 2013). However, 
states are also allowed to make the requirement more restrictive than that of federal law (Based on the article on 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/1996_Personal_Responsibility_and_Work_Opportunity_Reconciliation_Act, 
accessed on December 18, 2013).  
9 The cost is referred to the burden that the individuals have in meeting the eligibilities and requirements of the 
welfare and this includes the cost of migration, while the benefit is the welfare benefit itself. 
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Feldstein (2005) and Besley and Coate (1992) pointed out that government might be 
unable to distinguish two types of individuals: those who were poor (or short-sighted to save) 
and those who were intentionally ‘gaming’ the system (e.g. by not saving, not working or 
reducing his work hours) in order to qualify for benefits. J. Currie and Gahvari (2008) also 
agreed that the second type took steps to reduce their incomes to make themselves eligible for 
the benefit. For simplicity, this study refers to the first type as true poor and the second type as 
fake poor.  
The second differential came from two motives, namely welfare’s degrees of 
attractiveness that were different across periods of time (hereafter, time differential) and a 
finitely long time period that individuals might stay on welfare program10. In this paper, I 
defined welfare’s degree of attractiveness based on how one valued the welfare given his/her 
characteristics. These degrees might change as the characteristics changed (e.g. change in wage 
rate) and as the program design changed over time. The time period was set by state 
governments and varied across states. Due to this differential, ineligible individuals would 
engage in another strategic behavior: procrastination. Individuals procrastinated on the 
application process until they found the benefit attractive enough. The procrastination might be 
triggered by a government requirement that the benefit recipients must be recertified after an 
interval of time in order to stay in the welfare program. These recertification interval, however, 
could be a reason why households with incomes above the threshold were on public assistance 
(J. Currie & Gahvari, 2008). 
                                                 
10 Federal government required that the eligible individuals can get cash benefit, i.e. TANF, for only sixty months 
which include months that they get in another state. There are some exceptions, though, that they may receive more 
than sixty months of TANF benefits. However, to limit the scope of analyses, these exceptions are not of concerns 
of this study. 
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The main goal of this study is to provide a solution to the inter-jurisdiction and dynamic 
information asymmetry within the welfare program. To achieve the goal, I will use a double-
signal model to construct the inter-jurisdiction and dynamic models.  
This paper will address the following research questions: What will be the response of the 
existing applicants after the introduction of double signals in both static and dynamic settings 
and in both intra- and inter-jurisdiction? How can government impose consistent ordeals and 
construct consistent benefit eligibilities across periods? How can inter-governments impose 
consistent ordeals and construct consistent benefit eligibilities that capture the mobility of 
applicants and competition among jurisdictions? 
There are at least two major outcomes expected from this study. Firstly, government is 
able to make applicants indifferent to applying in any jurisdictions and in any periods of time. 
Secondly, the study might show how the mechanism through imposing double signals can 
increase the overall social welfare.11 Technically, outcomes would be an increase in benefit 
recipients from the true poor group, a decrease in cost of welfare benefit due to migration and 
procrastination and a lower poor concentration. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the literature review. 
Section III describes the inter-jurisdictional and procrastination models. Section IV provides the 
policy implication and concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
11 To check this, one can compare the resulting social welfare when the eligibility is based on income level and 
when it is based on time filter and essential components where the social welfare of the latter should be higher than 
that of the former. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
With the possibility of migrating to other jurisdictions, finding solution to the information 
asymmetry problem would be harder than without that possibility. Mitigating the information 
asymmetry problem only in jurisdiction A might not be an effective way in directing the benefit 
to the needy. The problem might occur when the ineligible individuals from jurisdiction A 
decided to reside and applied for the benefit in jurisdiction B. Some had paid attention on 
welfare-induce migration. Stuber and Kronebusch (2004) pointed out that the jurisdiction 
differentials might be due to the fact that jurisdictions had considerable discretion in designing 
and implementing welfare programs such as TANF and adult Medicaid as long as both design 
and implementations were within the defined federal limits and, as Saving (1999) discussed, this 
jurisdictional differential gave incentive to individuals to move from one jurisdiction to another.  
Using micro-data from the 1980 and 1990 Decennial Censuses, McKinnish (2007) found 
evidence of welfare migration in 1980, particularly, among mothers with children under 18 that 
were never-married, previously-married and married. Specifically, higher welfare benefit was to 
lower the probability that mothers leave their state. Gelbach (2004) emphasized that the period of 
welfare benefit played a role in the migration decision. For example, migration for welfare 
benefit was likely when a mother had young children and when the period of benefit eligibility 
was longer. Additionally, Fiva (2009) found that welfare policy had a substantial effect on 
residential choices of welfare recipients. Hoyt and Lee (2003) and Saving (1999) showed that 
poor individuals were mobile for welfare benefit. Saving added that an increase in jurisdictions' 
welfare recipient population would lower the jurisdictional income. Fiva found that this 
migration could also result in an increase in cost of welfare generosity by 12% higher than it 
would be in the absence of welfare migration. More importantly, poor individuals made a greater 
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marginal contribution to the congestion than would an employed individual, and employed 
individuals faced more powerful incentives to move away from concentration of poor individuals 
(Glazer & Konrad, 1993; Saving, 1999). This was in line with the study by Besley and Coate 
(1995) that assumed that labor supply elasticity was non-increasing to ensure that higher wage 
individuals had less elastic labor supply. 
The idea of procrastination was similar to the one underlying the inter-temporal 
consumption idea which was to smooth the consumption over time. Chetty and Looney (2006) 
pointed out that because individuals were risk averse, they smoothed their consumption path with 
various mechanisms (e.g. keeping children from going to school, receiving social safety net, etc.) 
even in the presence of income shocks. Another kind of mechanism to smooth consumption, as 
presented by Gruber (2000), was cash welfare (i.e. AFDC). Consumption smoothing by poor 
individual was also discussed by Zimmerman and Carter (2003)12 and Kazianga and Udry 
(2006)13. 
Besley and Coate (1992) argued that if it was true that the ineligible individuals gamed 
the system, the benefits might lead individuals to make choices that increased the likelihood that 
they would have to draw on such benefits in the future. This would result in inter-temporal 
information asymmetry. All being said, the existence of both jurisdiction and time differentials 
                                                 
12 Poor individuals, who are closer to a subsistence minimum—and therefore in danger of losing future labor power 
if consumption falls too low—pursue a more conservative investment strategy than do wealthier agents. They 
heavily invested in consumable assets (i.e. grain), which offer a low return. 
13 Exploring the extent of consumption smoothing between 1981 and 1985, the severe drought period, in rural 
Burkina Faso, showed evidence of little consumption smoothing by extremely poor households which was far from 
perfect smoothing. In particular, there was no evidence that livestock served as an effective buffer stock during this 
period, nor was there significant use of financial markets to smooth the aggregate shocks. Households' consumptions 
fell and rose with their incomes. Surprisingly, they found that there was a strong correlation between the decline in 
labor use on the household farm and positive transitory shocks to income. This may shed the light on the argument 
that poor individuals place bigger hope on public benefits than on labor income since they are more likely to 
encounter more transitory shocks than does the rich. This may motivate the poor to hunt the benefit across the 
periods to offset the effects of the shock. Therefore, whether or not the shock is present, relying on the benefit may 
be one favorable behavior of the poor. 
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would further increase the incentives of fake poor to masquerade as true poor since it provided 
more choices of ways of applying. The individuals could choose which jurisdiction and when to 
apply.  
There are several approaches to mitigate information asymmetry. According to Gruber 
(2009), targeting and ordeal mechanism are two approaches that can be used to mitigate the 
information asymmetry, particularly, reduce the moral hazards in welfare programs. Many 
studies have discussed the information asymmetry within government welfare program. 
Surprisingly, none of them have attempted to bring the discussion into inter-jurisdictional and 
dynamic contexts. 
Hence, it is important to design some policies that restrict the individuals from applying 
in any jurisdictions and at any particular time. That is, due to these policies, if the individuals are 
ineligible in one jurisdiction, other jurisdictions must not make them eligible, or vice versa in 
order to discourage the benefit-induced migration. Also, if the net benefit is not attractive for a 
particular group of individuals at a particular time, it should be unattractive in a time span 
determined by a government. When the individuals find the net benefit not attractive, they decide 
to opt out.  
This paper uses double-signal approach as the ordeal mechanism. The ordeals are treated 
as signals. The signals are application time and essential component. Application time refers to 
how much time an applicant can spend in the process of applying; while essential component 
refers to a good or service that an applicant must inevitably consume in a particular geographic 
area or shelter. Due to different characteristics of the applicants, one applicant can bear the costs 
of sending signals up to a certain level of the cost which may be different from other applicants. 
54 
 
This, in turn, signals their differences. In equilibrium, the true poor can be separated from the 
fake ones.  
This paper contributes to literatures in three respects. Firstly, the paper takes initial steps 
toward analyzing the inter-jurisdictional and multi-period equilibria of welfare program under 
information asymmetry using signaling model. Secondly, using the multi-period analyses, this 
paper provides guidance to government on how to impose consistent ordeals across periods that 
accounts for the welfare’s degree of attractiveness. Thirdly, this paper provides guidance to inter-
governments on how to impose consistent ordeals that captures the mobility of applicants. 
Ability to capture the mobility of the applicants may help government account for the inter-
jurisdictional migration that may create incentive to arbitrage the benefit among jurisdictions 
with different eligibility requirements or level of benefits. In turn, the guidance may strengthen 
the synergy between two jurisdictional governments (i.e. either between the same level 
governments or governments at different levels). For example, while the same level governments 
(e.g. state governments) can work together in determining the optimal size of ordeals that can 
mitigate the information asymmetry and in making some adjustments in the eligibility and the 
size of benefit to support the ordeals, federal or central governments can coordinate with 
governments of neighboring states to accommodate the optimal size of ordeals of each state and 
integrate it in the system of welfare of the states and make some adjustments in the eligibility 
and the size of transfer to support the ordeals. 
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III.  THE MODELS 
a. Inter-Jurisdictional Model 
Consider a signaling game of welfare benefit, represented as a 7-tuple ℊ =
{𝑇, (𝑟, 𝑒), 𝑏𝐽, 𝜌, 𝐽, 𝑈, 𝑊}, which consists of two players, a sender (S) which is drawn from a group 
of welfare applicants with two types, and a receiver (R) which is a government; and specifies a 
space of the sender’s type 𝑇 = {𝑡, 𝑡̅}, a space of sender’s signal  𝜁 = {𝑟, 𝑒} which are the 
required-hour (i.e. time) 𝑟 and electricity usage as the essential component 𝑒, a choice of 
jurisdiction where 𝐽 = {𝑗, 𝑘}, a space of receiver’s action 𝑏 in jurisdiction 𝐽, a prior probability 𝜌 
that S is of type 𝑡 where 𝜌(𝑡) ∈ [0,1) and ∑ 𝜌(𝑡)𝑡 = 1, a payoff function of senders 𝑈, and a 
payoff function of receiver 𝑊. S receives private information which is S’s type 𝑡, drawn from a 
finite set of types 𝑇. The sender’s type is drawn according to some probability distribution 𝜌 over 
𝑇. That is, the probability is given by 𝜌 if S is of type 𝑡 (so called true poor), and 1 − 𝜌 if S is of 
type 𝑡̅ (so called fake poor); 𝜌 is common knowledge. Since the types are ordered according to 
income level, it is normal to restrict that 𝑡 < 𝑡̅ which implies that the income of true poor is 
lower than that of fake poor. Note that, from now on, any variable 𝑣 and ?̅? are associated to 𝑡 and 
𝑡̅ types of S respectively, that is 𝑣 = 𝑣(𝑡) and ?̅? = 𝑣(𝑡)̅. Having learnt his type, S sends signals 
(𝑟, 𝑒) to R chosen out of some finite set (ℛ, ℰ). The set of signals available to S depends upon 
S’s type, that is, (ℛ(𝑡), ℰ(𝑡)) are the signals available to type 𝑡. 𝑇(𝑟, 𝑒) is the set of types that 
have signals (𝑟, 𝑒). It is worth pointing out that the game of welfare benefit starts only when the 
individuals choose to apply which then enable them to send signals. That being said, this study 
assumes that the individuals apply. R in jurisdiction 𝑗 observes (𝑟, 𝑒) but not 𝑡 and then chooses 
an action 𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝐵𝑗, a finite set of actions. The action depends on the signals received, writing 
𝐵𝑗(𝑟, 𝑒). The players then calculate the net benefit based on the benefit and cost of applying in 
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jurisdiction 𝑗. If they find that net benefit in jurisdiction 𝑗 is greater than the potential net benefit 
in jurisdiction 𝑘, the game ends with this action, and payoffs are made to the players. Otherwise, 
the players migrate to and play the game in jurisdiction 𝑘 until the payoffs are made. 
The players have von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff functions. The sender’s payoff 
function in jurisdiction 𝐽 is defined over type 𝑡, private goods consumption 𝑥′, signal (𝑟, 𝑒), 
leisure 𝑙 and action 𝑏𝐽, writing 𝑈(𝑡, 𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏𝐽(𝑟, 𝑒)), while the receiver’s payoff function is 
defined over type 𝑡, non-welfare spending 𝐺, signal (𝑟, 𝑒), and action 𝑏, writing 
𝑊𝐽(𝑡, 𝐺, 𝑏𝐽(𝑟, 𝑒)). These functions are taken to be continuous in (𝑟, 𝑒) and 𝑏; and continuously 
differentiable. 𝑈𝐵(ℛ,ℰ) > 0, 𝑈r < 0 and 𝑈e < 0 are assumed, so that the sender prefers to send 
more signals to induce larger actions at the cost of their overall payoff. That said, there exists ?̂? ∈
𝑇, ?̂? ∈ 𝑟 and ?̂? ∈ 𝑒 such that 𝑈(?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑏𝐽(?̂?, ?̂?)) < 𝑈(?̂?, ?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑏𝐽(?̅?, ?̅?)) where ?̂? is the highest 
possible level of 𝑟 and ?̂? is the lowest possible level of 𝑒 that both levels might incur the highest 
possible cost of signaling. This implies the signals’ boundary condition that makes sending high 
signals (higher than sufficient levels) unattractive for the highest type ?̂?. As for the receiver, 𝑊𝐽 
is strictly quasiconcave in 𝐵 for each (ℛ, ℰ) and 𝑡, with 𝑊𝐽 maximized in 𝐵 by 𝐵𝐽
∗
((ℛ, ℰ), 𝑡). 
Moreover, 𝑊𝐵
𝐽
 is strictly decreasing in 𝑡 for each (ℛ, ℰ) and 𝐵𝐽, which implies that 
𝐵𝐽
∗
((ℛ, ℰ), 𝑡) is strictly decreasing in 𝑡. Intuitively, the receiver will choose larger action if she 
can be convinced that 𝑡 is smaller.  
The optimal levels of signals 𝑟∗ and 𝑒∗ give the cutoffs of the signals with 0 < ?̅? < 𝑟∗ ≤
𝑟 and 0 < 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒∗ < ?̅?. Let 𝑚 be the per-hour opportunity cost such that 0 < 𝑚 < ?̅? where 𝑚 =
𝑚(𝑡) and ?̅? = 𝑚(𝑡̅) and let 𝑟𝑚 be the total opportunity cost such that 𝑚𝑟 < ?̅?𝑟. Note that, due 
to cost of associated to the signals and to the types, higher (lower) type has higher (lower) cost of 
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sending signal ?̅? but lower (higher) cost of sending signal ?̅?. That said, higher type has higher 
electricity usage but lower required-hour, writing ?̅? < 𝑟 and ?̅? > 𝑒 for all 𝑡̅ > 𝑡. To avoid 
confusion that may arise from different direction of change of both signals, the direction is made 
equivalent since the concern here is not on the direction of change but on how much the change 
is. In this case, increasing 𝑟 means that the sender increases the required-hour, while increasing 𝑒 
means that the sender decreases the electricity usage. So to make it equivalent, increasing 𝑒 
means that the sender hypothetically buys one ticket for every one unit reduction in electricity 
usage. 
Assumption 1. The signals are strictly monotone and continuous in type. That is, signal 𝑒 
is strictly increasing while signal 𝑟 is strictly decreasing in 𝑡 and the cost of increasing signals is 
increasing in types. 
This assumption defines the costs associated to the signals. The cost of sending signal of 
a higher type is bigger than that of the lower type. Higher type has more electricity usage but less 
time available for the application process than lower type. When the optimal levels of signals 𝑟∗ 
and 𝑒∗, such that 0 < ?̅? < 𝑟∗ ≤ 𝑟 and 0 < 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒∗ < ?̅?, are required, moving monotonically and 
continuously toward the optimal levels is less painful for the lower type than the higher type 
which makes the cost imposed to the higher type is bigger than that to the lower type. That said, 
as long as the change is monotone and continuous, it is still possible to show that MRS is 
increasing in type (i.e. 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑟,𝑒) which ensures that the indifference curves through a 
particular point have larger slopes for larger types. This implies a single-crossing property of 
indifference curves. Consequently, the different slopes make it possible for lower type to 
separate from the higher type. 
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One important thing in doing these inter-jurisdictional analyses is that the net benefit, the 
difference between costs and benefit in one jurisdiction, received in jurisdiction 𝑗 should be 
easily compared to that in jurisdictions 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗. For this reason, the following assumption is 
needed. 
Assumption 2. Everything else equal, individuals from the same income group value the 
benefit and cost dollars the same regardless where, when and how they get or spend. 
That is, if the amount of money received 𝑏 is equal to the amount of money spent 𝐶, then 
total payoffs generated from them should be the same, that is, 𝑈(𝑏) = 𝑈(𝐶). This may allow one 
to focus on how the electricity usage and time spent in application process might affect the utility 
through the cost and the benefit of welfare programs. This implies that an increase by $1 in 
benefit would increase the individual’s payoff by marginal coefficient of benefit (MCB) and a 
decrease by $1 in migration cost would increase the payoff by marginal coefficient of cost 
(MCC) which equals to MCB. If the net benefit received in jurisdiction 𝑗 is the same as that in 
jurisdiction 𝑘, the payoffs generated are the ones such that 𝑈[𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖)] =
𝑈[𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑘(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖)]. However, due to different characteristics, the individuals from different 
groups may value differently the same net benefit. Formally, if net benefit of type 𝑖 is given by 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖), while the net benefit of type 𝑖̃ is given by 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏 ?̃?𝑗(𝑟 ?̃?, 𝑒 ?̃?), then 
𝑈[𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖)] ≠ 𝑈[𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏?̃?𝑗(𝑟 ?̃?, 𝑒 ?̃?)], even though 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) = 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏?̃?𝑗(𝑟 ?̃?, 𝑒 ?̃?). This is the 
first of two key points of inter-jurisdictional model.  
Given migration cost 𝑐𝑗,𝑘, the incentive condition to migrate from jurisdiction 𝑗 to 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
is 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) ≤ 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑘(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) − 𝑐𝑗,𝑘. By assumption 2, this implies that 𝑈(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗) ≤
𝑈(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑘 − 𝑐𝑗,𝑘). While I restrict that 𝑏(. ) ≥ 0, it is not necessary to restrict the set of 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏(. ). 
Note that 𝑈(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗) = 𝑈(𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗) when 𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 1. In this study, the optimal MCB 
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has accounted the cost of applying. Intuitively, 𝑈(𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑗) = 𝑈(𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗∗ ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑗) =
𝑈(𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗∗ ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖)) by letting 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑖, 𝑒𝑖). The incentive condition works when the 
following assumptions hold. Firstly, it is assumed that higher net benefit in jurisdiction 𝑘 is the 
only driving factor of migration which means that average living cost and potential income of a 
particular income group of individuals in jurisdiction 𝑘 is relatively similar to that in jurisdiction 
𝑗. Although costs in these jurisdictions may be different, the difference in income may offset the 
difference in cost.14 Secondly, the individuals may not observe any difference in living cost and 
income between the jurisdictions. Thirdly, it is assumed that MCB generated from applying in 
jurisdiction 𝑗 equals to that in jurisdiction 𝑘.  
In order to prevent migration, a government makes a policy such that inter-jurisdictional 
condition 𝑈(𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗∗ ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑗) = 𝑈(𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑘∗ ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑘) − 𝑈(𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑘∗ ∗ 𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑘) holds where 𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑘∗ =
𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑘∗ by assumption 2. Therefore, since the government cannot control 𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑘, there are two 
options of policy the government can make to meet the condition. Note that government 𝑘 can 
gather information about 𝑀𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗∗ and 𝑏𝑖𝑗 from government 𝑗. The first option is to adjust 𝑏𝑖𝑘 
(e.g. reducing 𝑏𝑖𝑘) at the risk of lowering its own applicants’ welfare. The second one is to adjust 
the signals’ cutoff which will, in turn, adjust 𝑀𝐶𝐵(𝑏𝑖𝑘). Since there are many factors associated 
to 𝑀𝐶𝐵(𝑏𝑖𝑘), government has much more flexibility in adjusting 𝑀𝐶𝐵(𝑏𝑖𝑘) than adjusting 𝑏𝑖𝑘 
without increasing the risk. The second option is the second key point of the model. 
Before solving the inter-jurisdictional condition, I need to solve for the MCB. This can be 
done by maximizing the payoff function 𝑈(𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 +
                                                 
14 I realize that there is a caveat with this analysis since it does not account the situation where benefit in jurisdiction 
k is higher than that in jurisdiction j while at the same time difference of income and living cost in jurisdiction k is 
greater than that in jurisdiction j. However, although both benefits and living costs may be the driving factors of 
migration, when government in jurisdiction k has mitigated the information asymmetry, the individuals only 
generate extra benefit from the difference between living cost and income. This is not the focus of this study. 
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𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) for each type of individuals (hereafter, applicants): fake and true poor. This is the 
payoff function of the applicant in any jurisdiction. Particularly, the true poor maximizes 𝑈 and 
the fake poor maximizes 𝑈 subject to their respective budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) +
𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑒𝑒, where 𝐻 = 𝑙 + ℎ + 𝑟; 𝜎1 +
𝜎2 + 𝜎3 + 𝜎4 = 1; 𝑦
′ = (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 +
(1 − 𝜏)𝑚ℎ + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ is the total income which is the sum of the 
first-best total income and the missing potential tax liabilities, 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ. The MCB is 𝜎4. 
Government of any jurisdiction maximizes its payoff function 𝑊 = 𝑊(𝐺, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜌𝑈(. ) +
(1 − 𝜌)𝑈(. ) subjects to 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) +
𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) − 𝑃𝑔𝐺 ≥ 0; first individual rationality 
(IR1) 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) ≥ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞; second 
individual rationality (IR2) 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) ≤
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞
; first incentive compatibility (IC1) 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) =
𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒); second incentive compatibility (IC2) 
𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒), where 𝑈
𝑞 and 
𝑈
𝑞
 are constants and 𝜌 is the probability that the applicant is a true poor individual. IR constraint 
is to ensure that the payoff from applying should be at least as high as that from not applying in 
order to encourage the true poor to participate in the welfare program, while it is the opposite for 
the fake poor. IR1 and IC2 constraints are binding while IR2 and IC1 are not binding (i.e. by 
setting lagrange multipliers associated to IR2 and IC1 equal to 0 and to IR1 and IC2 be positive 
values). Taking the first derivatives of 𝑊 with respect to 𝜏, 𝜏, 𝑒, 𝑒, 𝑟, and 𝑟, the MCBs are 𝜎4
∗ =
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𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒⁄ 𝑚)
 and 𝜎4
∗ =
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
. Government’s only concern is the strategic 
behavior of fake poor applicants. Therefore, in order to prevent them from migration, 
government of any jurisdiction should make a policy such that between jurisdictions 𝑗 and 𝑘 the 
inter-jurisdictional condition 𝑈 ([
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
]
𝑖𝑗
∗ 𝑏
𝑖𝑗
) = 𝑈 ([
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
]
𝑖𝑘
∗
𝑏
𝑖𝑘
) − 𝑈([
𝜎2𝑚𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
]
𝑖𝑘
∗ 𝑐
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
) holds. By assumption 2, the condition above implies that  
[
𝜎2𝑚𝑏
2
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
]
𝑖𝑗
[
𝜎2𝑚𝑏
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
]
𝑖𝑘 = 𝑏
𝑖𝑘
− 𝑐
𝑗,𝑘
.        (1) 
Intuitively, MCB ratio should equal to post migration net benefit (i.e. the benefit in 
jurisdiction 𝑘 minus the migration cost). The result suggests that government in jurisdiction 𝑘 
makes a policy by choosing a particular level of electricity usage and time so that the resulting 
MCB, i.e. 𝜎4, could equalize the MCB ratio and post migration net benefit. I call this an inter-
jurisdictional adjustment policy. That is, an adjustment is made so that the policy accounts other 
jurisdiction’s policy. Here, the role of federal government is necessary to coordinate and ease the 
adjustment policy by providing information and establishing an agreement between two 
jurisdictions or by helping make the adjustment. For example, if the MCB in jurisdiction 𝑗 is too 
low to equalize both sides of equation (1), government in jurisdiction 𝑘 should lower its MCB. In 
some cases, it may be too low to go. In these cases, federal government may help either increase 
the MCB in jurisdiction 𝑗 or decrease the MCB in jurisdiction 𝑘. 
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b. Procrastination Problem 
To mitigate the information asymmetry caused by procrastination, I use a dynamic 
signaling model. In dynamic context, the signaling games are extended to model a class of 
repeated version of one-shot signaling game in which the types of the applicants who act as 
senders are persistent and the history of actions is common knowledge. The idea of persistency is 
that government who acts as a receiver is aware of the persistence of the type of applicants, in 
average, for particular periods of time. Particularly, the levels of signals (i.e. time and electricity 
usage) chosen in earlier periods could signal the type of applicants in the future periods. It 
implies that if the signal is not optimal to deviate once in any period and for any history, it is still 
not optimal whatever times the deviation is done.15 The equilibrium requires that the payoff 
generated from never deviating action should be at least as high as that generated from deviating 
action (although only once or only in one period). In other word, for a strategy profile, that 
prescribes stage strategy taken in every period, to be an equilibrium strategy, it must be that the 
payoff one can receive given that strategy profile (i.e. being its own type) should be at least as 
high as the other strategy profiles that specifies deviating actions (i.e. being other type).  
There are three thoughts about incorporating dynamic context in the models. The first is 
to provide insights on how to limit the inter-temporal choices of individuals such that the 
individuals will not have incentives to procrastinate on the application process after they get 
rejected. The second is to ensure that the payoff of the intended recipients will not be lower in 
                                                 
15 The proof of this is simple. Suppose that S chooses its multi-stage optimal strategy profile which contains a 
strategy that applies for the whole game or the repeated game (i.e. level of signals that meet the cutoffs in all 
periods, e.g. level of 𝑟 in any period 𝑛 satisfy 𝑟𝑛 ≥ 𝑟∗) but the period one, and receives payoff 𝑏, which is the 
benefit when she could meet the cutoff set by R. In period 1 or stage 1, S chooses the non-optimal stage strategy and 
her payoff is 0. So her overall payoff will be 0 + 𝛿𝑏 + 𝛿2𝑏 + ⋯ = 𝛿(
𝑏
1−𝛿
) which is her present value of payoffs. As 
shown later, if she never deviates her overall payoff is 
𝑏
1−𝛿
> 𝛿(
𝑏
1−𝛿
) given that 0 < 𝛿 < 1. For random stream of 
payoff, one can refer to Harrington (2008, p. 420). 
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any periods than today, so that they will stay in the program. The third is to elaborate how the 
expected sum of lifetime payoffs allow for multiple opportunities for either government or 
applicants to act in a self-interested manner which then might create incentives to game the 
system. This outcome is exhibiting one facet of benefit ineffectiveness. As shown later, some 
restrictions such as imposing necessary constraints are needed. Like in one-shot model (e.g. the 
earlier inter-jurisdictional model), to be credible signals, the signals taken by the true poor type 
should be sufficiently costly to ensure that the fake poor type does not masquerade as the true 
poor.16 Therefore, masquerading as the true poor would result in a lower payoff that the fake 
poor would have otherwise. According to Kaya (2009), in repeated signaling model, signals in 
different periods are to some extent substitutes so that the cost of signaling can credibly be 
distributed across periods. This gives an incentive to the fake poor to choose any particular 
period to apply for the benefit. In order to prevent this from happening, the credibility of a 
sequence of actions as signals is subject to certain incentive compatibility constraints.  
Unlike Kaya (2009) that only assumes that the types of individuals are fixed throughout 
the periods, I assume the following: 
Assumption 3. The types of individuals are fixed throughout the periods on welfare only 
when a zero shock happens in these periods.  
Assumption 3 simply says that, unless there is a shock, the applicant’s income status is 
likely to remain the same throughout the periods on welfare. The inclusion of shock in the 
analysis is to add flexibility of the model.  
                                                 
16 This idea also aligns with the price and advertising case of Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Particularly, the high 
quality firms’ signals (advertising and price) are no longer credible if they reduce the level of signals to the levels 
where low quality firms would be willing to mimic. 
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The procrastination problem can be explained by the following.  In period 𝑛, a 
government offers a benefit package 𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛) and an individual observes this 
package. 𝑠𝑛 ∈ (−1,1) is an external shock rate that is independent of applicant’s characteristics. 
When 0 < 𝑠𝑛 < 1, there is a shock that results in a higher level of electricity usage or lower level 
of time which both indicate a higher level of income. When −1 < 𝑠𝑛 < 0, there is a shock that 
results in a lower level of electricity usage or higher level of time which both indicate a lower 
level of income. When 𝑠𝑛 = 0, there is no shock. Note that since time and income have negative 
relationship, a positive shock means a reduction in time spent. Mathematically, it can be done by 
multiplying whatever shock rate with −1.  
In period 𝑛, if the individuals finds that the package attractive such that it may result in a 
higher payoff, he/she then applies for the benefit. She/he is now called as an applicant. In period 
𝑛, government may not be facing an information asymmetry problem so that it only gives the 
benefit to the true poor. After being ineligible in period 𝑛, fake poor has to wait for the next 
period ?̃?. One thing worth pointing out is that although government has been able to solve the 
asymmetry in period 𝑛, it does not imply that it has been solved for any other periods. The 
argument behind this is that after being rejected in period 𝑛, the fake poor observes the signals’ 
level required in period 𝑛 and makes some adjustments such that its level of signals chosen in 
period ?̃? matches the level required in period 𝑛. This is an issue that while fake poor has an 
ability to adjust its level of signals, government may carry the same level required from period 𝑛 
to ?̃? unless there is a change in government policy. 
In this study, one period can be a single recertification interval period or any other period 
which is defined as a number of eligible months that an applicant can receive a benefit before 
government requires him/her to submit the same kind of documents he/she submitted in the 
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previous period or on the first time he/she applied for the benefit. The number of period varies by 
government policy and types of welfare programs.  
In a multi-period welfare game, applicant and government repeatedly encounters each 
other over time. This repeated game is played in multi-periods of time, in particular, it is played 
in an infinite horizon game in which the applicant meets a series of government. Each 
government from each period is assumed to be active for only one period, has different 
characteristics from one to another period and perfectly observes the history of all signals. In 
term of different characteristics, government may have, for example, slightly different policies 
from period to period in term of eligibility requirements, number of eligibles conditioned on 
budget constraints, technical requirements, etc. Since both the applicant and the government 
know what they have done in previous periods, the game satisfies perfect recall. The applicant 
and the government have the same encounter – known as the stage game. This is a building block 
used to develop the repeated game – over time. 17 In this case, a number of senders (i.e. 
applicants) plays against a number of receivers (i.e. governments). Although, after all, we do not 
have eternal lives, it does not make sense to presume that either the applicant or the government 
knows precisely when these encounters will end. Therefore, the following assumption is needed. 
Assumption 4. The welfare game has an infinite horizon which means that the encounters 
continue for sure.18  
Assumption 4 implies that both the applicant and the government never know for sure 
that the current encounter is the last one. This assumption lies on the idea that even though the 
game consists of finitely-lived players but the game itself is an infinitely-lived institution in 
                                                 
17 The definition of stage game is adopted from Harrington (2008). 
18 Harrington (2008, p. 407) provides some experimental evidence when the game is a one-shot, a finitely repeated 
and an indefinite horizon (which is equivalent to infinite one) and the evidence.is consistent with the game theory’s 
prediction when the game is played infinite (or indefinite). 
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which old players will be replaced by new ones; and even though, due to finite lifetimes of 
players, one player cannot discipline or punish the other player that cheats, the institution at large 
might be able to perform that function. This assumption also rules out the possibility to do 
backward induction since there is no final subgame to initiate such induction. Repetition of 
strategic interactions is the key to solving the optimality that results in the highest social 
welfare19. As Harrington (2008) points out, the cooperation is stable if the following conditions 
hold: encounters must be repeated and there must always be the prospect of future encounters, 
how a player has behaved must be detectable (which comes from the idea that the history is 
common knowledge, that is, the reward-punishment scheme will work only if deviation is 
observed and thereby punished), and players must care sufficiently about what happens in the 
future (which is shown by the degree of attractiveness).20 
In term of procrastination, the fake poor applicant engages in a procrastination behavior 
when he/she finds that applying in the future is better-off. The underlying reason may be that 
government is facing information asymmetry issue in the future due to any changes in welfare 
policy (e.g. changes in level of benefit and changes in eligibility level of signals) or any changes 
in applicant’s characteristics in order to be eligible. The changes in level of benefit can be 
followed by the changes in signals’ level. However, the applicant may respond to any changes in 
policy by changing their characteristics. Hence, whether or not there is a change in the policy, 
the applicant has incentive to change its characteristics in order to be eligible for the benefit.  
Now, suppose that government is able to mitigate today’s information asymmetry issue. 
By assumption 3, government should be able to filter the fake poor out from the application 
                                                 
19 Harrington (2008, p. 393) pointed out that the repeated encounters sustain cooperation, that is the players will 
have higher payoffs when the game is repeated than when it is played just once. 
20 By common knowledge history, one can make inference that at each period the players can base their strategies on 
the complete previous history of the various stages. 
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process in the future without having to worry about the potential future asymmetry issue. That 
said, government should be able to make its lifetime payoff or social welfare after mitigating the 
information asymmetry in any period 𝑛 equal to that before mitigating the asymmetry. 
Particularly, ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑊(𝐺𝑛, 𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛))
∞
𝑛=0 = ∑ 𝜔
𝑛𝑊(𝐺𝑛, 𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))
∞
𝑛=0 . While the 
left hand side is the lifetime payoff after mitigating the asymmetry, the right hand side is the 
lifetime payoff before mitigating the asymmetry.21 That said, the government does not need to 
worry about the potential asymmetry issue that may occur any time in the future when 
government has been able to mitigate it in any period 𝑛 because the government can use the 
asymmetry solution in period 𝑛 as an indirect solution to the asymmetry issue in other periods. 
By indirect solution, government can calculate the lifetime payoff based on that particular 
solution. For this, the following assumption is necessary. 
Assumption 5. Both applicant and government take into account their payoff for all 
encounters, not just for the first one, and that the payoff is influenced by the entire stream of 
single-period payoffs or the overall payoffs.22  
Assumption 5 implies that a player (either the applicant or the government) chooses a 
strategy profile, which prescribes an action (i.e. signal) for each period, contingent on the history 
                                                 
21 ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑊(𝐺𝑛 , 𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))
∞
𝑛=0  is a lifetime payoff before mitigating the information asymmetry which is indicated by 
the presence of unreported income 𝛾 in applicant’s budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) +
𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑦) = 𝑝𝑥𝑥, where 𝐻 = 𝑙 + ℎ; 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 1 and 𝑦
′ = (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) +
𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚ℎ + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ is the total income which is the sum of the 
first-best total income and the missing potential tax liabilities, 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ. 
22 For example, in one case, if n=3 and the history is [(𝑟 > 𝑟∗, 𝑒 < 𝑒∗), 𝑏 = 𝑏∗], [(𝑟 > 𝑟∗, 𝑒 < 𝑒∗), 𝑏 = 0], 
[(𝑟 < 𝑟∗, 𝑒 > 𝑒∗), 𝑏 = 𝑏∗], that is in period one S send signal that meets R’s cutoff (i.e. (𝑟 > 𝑟∗, 𝑒 < 𝑒∗)) and R 
responds with 𝑏 = 𝑏∗; in period two, S send the same signal but R responds with 𝑏 = 0; and in period three S send 
signal that does not meet R’s cutoff and R responds with 𝑏 = 𝑏∗, then the stream of single-period payoffs for S is 
𝑥 + 𝑏∗, 𝑥, 𝑥 + 𝑏∗ where 𝑥 is S’s initial endowment. In other case, the stream may be different. For example, whether 
the stream of 𝑥, 𝑥 + 𝑏∗, 𝑥 is better than the former is not so obvious because the former one is better in period 1 and 
3 while the latter is better in period 2. 
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for every history and thus on what a player knows, so as to maximize the overall payoff which is 
the sum of single-period payoffs. 
Therefore, the first step to solve the procrastination problem is to solve the lifetime 
payoff accounting for the information asymmetry. Over 𝑛 periods, an applicant maximizes 
payoff function 𝑈[{𝑥𝑛
′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ }0
∞, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞, {𝑏𝑛({𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛}0
∞, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞)}0
∞] =
∑ 𝜔𝑛[𝜗1𝑛 ln(𝑥𝑛
′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ ) + 𝜗2𝑛 ln(𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛) + 𝜗3𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑛 + 𝜗4𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)]
∞
0  for 
each type of applicants, fake and true poor. Particularly, the true poor maximizes 𝑈 and the fake 
poor maximizes 𝑈 subject to their respective budget constraint (1 + 𝑖)𝑛𝐴0 + ∑ [(1 −
∞
𝑛=0
𝜏𝑛)(𝜑𝑛 − 𝛾𝑛
𝜑
) + 𝛾𝑛
𝜑
+ (1 − 𝜏𝑛)(𝑚𝑛(𝐻𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 − (𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛)) − 𝛾𝑛
ℎ) + 𝛾𝑛
ℎ + 𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 +
𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)] = ∑ [𝑝𝑥𝑛′ (𝑥𝑛
′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ ) + 𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)]
∞
𝑛=0 , where 𝐻𝑛 = 𝑙𝑛 + ℎ𝑛 + (𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛); 𝜗1𝑛 +
𝜗2𝑛 + 𝜗3𝑛 + 𝜗4𝑛 = 1; 𝑦𝑛
′ = (1 − 𝜏𝑛)(𝜑𝑛 − 𝛾𝑛
𝜑
) + 𝛾𝑛
𝜑
+ (1 − 𝜏𝑛)(𝑚𝑛(𝐻𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 − (𝑟𝑛 +
𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛)) − 𝛾𝑛
ℎ) + 𝛾𝑛
ℎ = (1 − 𝜏𝑛)𝜑𝑛 + (1 − 𝜏𝑛)𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛 + 𝜏𝑛𝛾𝑛
𝜑
+ 𝜏𝑛𝛾𝑛
ℎ = (1 − 𝜏𝑛)𝑦𝑛 + 𝜏𝑛𝛾𝑛
𝜑
+
𝜏𝑛𝛾𝑛
ℎ is the total income which is the sum of the first-best total income and the missing potential 
tax liabilities, 𝜏𝑛𝛾𝑛
𝜑
+ 𝜏𝑛𝛾𝑛
ℎ; 𝜔𝑛 ∈ (0,1) is a degree of attractiveness; and 𝐴0 is the initial wealth 
of applicant.  The MCB is 𝜗4𝑛. Government maximizes its payoff function 𝑊 =
∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑊(𝐺𝑛, 𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛))
∞
𝑛=0 = 𝜌𝑈(. ) + (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(. ) subjects to budget constraint 
𝐷0 +
1
(1+𝑖)𝑛
∑ 𝜋𝑛 (𝜏𝑛 (𝑚𝑛 (𝐻𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 − (𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛)) − 𝛾𝑛
ℎ) + 𝜏𝑛 (𝜑𝑛 − 𝛾𝑛
𝜑
) −∞𝑛=0
𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)) +
1
(1+𝑖)𝑛
∑ 𝜋𝑛 (𝜏𝑛 (𝑚𝑛 (𝐻𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 − (𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛)) − 𝛾𝑛
ℎ) +∞𝑛=0
𝜏𝑛 (𝜑𝑛 −  𝛾𝑛
𝜑
) − 𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)) −
1
(1+𝑖)𝑛
∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛
∞
𝑛=0 ≥ 0; first individual rationality 
(IR1) 𝑈 [{𝑥𝑛
′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ }
0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑏𝑛 ({𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞
)}0
∞] ≥
𝑈 ({𝑥𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
) = ∑ 𝑈𝑛
𝑞∞
𝑛=0 ; second individual rationality (IR2) 𝑈 [{𝑥𝑛
′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛′ }0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 +
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𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑏𝑛({𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛}0
∞, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞)}0
∞] ≤ 𝑈 ({𝑥𝑛}0
∞, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
) = ∑ 𝑈𝑛
𝑞
∞
𝑛=0 ; first 
incentive compatibility (IC1) 𝑈 [{𝑥𝑛
′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ }
0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑏𝑛 ({𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 +
𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞
)}0
∞] ≥ 𝑈 [{𝑥𝑛
′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ }
0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑏𝑛({𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛}0
∞, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞)}0
∞]; 
second incentive compatibility (IC2) 𝑈 [{𝑥𝑛′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛′ }0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑏𝑛({𝑟𝑛 +
𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛}0
∞, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞)}0
∞] ≥ 𝑈 [{𝑥𝑛′ + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛′ }0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑏𝑛 ({𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛}0
∞
, {𝑒𝑛 +
𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛}0
∞
)}0
∞], where 𝑈𝑛
𝑞
 and 𝑈𝑛
𝑞
 are constants, 𝜌 is the probability that the applicant is a true poor 
individual and 𝐷0 is initial wealth of government, and 𝜋𝑛 and 𝜋𝑛 = 1 − 𝜋𝑛 are the proportions of 
the true and fake poor applicants. It is of interest to see how the social welfare improves, so the 
analysis focuses on partial contribution of benefit (i.e. marginal contribution of benefit, MCB) to 
the social welfare (i.e. government’s payoff function). Taking the first derivatives of 𝑊 with 
respect to 𝜏𝑛, 𝜏𝑛, 𝑒𝑛, 𝑒𝑛, 𝑟𝑛, and 𝑟𝑛, the optimal MCBs are 𝜗4𝑛
∗ =
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛+𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛,𝑒𝑛+𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)
(𝑒𝑛+𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)
 and 𝜗4𝑛
∗ =
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛+𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛,𝑒𝑛+𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)
(𝑒𝑛+𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛)(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)
. Intuitively, at any 
period 𝑛, the value of every benefit dollar true poor and fake poor applicants place are 𝜗4𝑛 and 
𝜗4𝑛 respectively. These MCBs represent the lifetime payoff of government accounting for the 
information asymmetry.  
The second step is to solve MCBs that represent the lifetime payoff of government 
without accounting the information asymmetry. In the information asymmetry case, government 
does not employ any signals as proxy to income but only relies on income level to determine 
eligibility. Therefore, applicant maximizes the same payoff function as shown before but does 
not account for time 𝑟 and electricity usage 𝑒, that is 𝑈[{𝑥𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛}0
∞, {𝑙𝑛}0
∞, {𝑏𝑛{𝑦𝑛 +
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𝑠𝑛𝑦𝑛}0
∞}0
∞] subject to applicant’s budget constraint. Government then maximizes 𝑊 =
∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑊(𝐺𝑛, 𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))
∞
𝑛=0  subject to government’s budget constraint. Taking the first derivatives 
of 𝑊 with respect to 𝜏𝑛, 𝜏𝑛, 𝑒𝑛, 𝑒𝑛, 𝑟𝑛, and 𝑟𝑛, the optimal MCBs are: 
∆3𝑛
∗ =
𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛−𝐷0(1+𝑖)𝑛−𝜋𝑛(𝜑𝑛+𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛+𝐴0(1+𝑖)𝑛)−𝜋𝑛(𝜏𝑛(𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛−𝛾𝑛
ℎ)+𝜏𝑛(𝜑𝑛− 𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))]
  
and 
∆3𝑛
∗ =
𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛−𝐷0(1+𝑖)𝑛−𝜋𝑛(𝜑𝑛+𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛+𝐴0(1+𝑖)𝑛)−𝜋𝑛(𝜏𝑛(𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛−𝛾𝑛
ℎ)+𝜏𝑛(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))]
. 
Recall that only fake poor applicant has an incentive to engage in procrastination 
behavior. That said, the final steps are to set the fake poor’s MCBs representing the lifetime 
payoff of government accounting for the information asymmetry equal to the fake poor’s MCBs 
representing the lifetime payoff of government without accounting the information asymmetry 
and to solve for the variables 𝑒𝑛 and 𝑟𝑛 representing the policy tools which provide conditions 
necessary to prevent the procrastination behavior. Particularly, by setting 𝜗4𝑛
∗ = ∆3𝑛
∗  and 
assuming that 𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛) = 𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛), the optimal cutoff level of electricity usage 
of fake poor usage in period 𝑛, 𝑒𝑛, is as follows: 
𝑒𝑛 =
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛−𝐷0(1+𝑖)
𝑛−𝜋𝑛(𝜑𝑛+𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛+𝐴0(1+𝑖)
𝑛)−𝜋𝑛(𝜏𝑛(𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛−𝛾𝑛
ℎ)+𝜏𝑛(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))]
(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)
. (2) 
From equation (2), the term in square bracket is a total spending leftover, 
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄  is the leftover weight,  
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛 −
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛 is a cross price signal effect 
and ∆1𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑛)(1 + 𝑠𝑛) is the effect weight. Equation (2) simply says that the electricity usage 
in period 𝑛 should equal to the ratio of weighted leftover and weighted signal effect in period 𝑛. 
This is the optimality condition prevents fake poor from procrastinating given the characteristics 
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of fake poor, true poor and government. The optimal level above gives a formulation of the 
required level of electricity usage in period 𝑛 that any applicant needs to meet in order to be 
eligible. However, this is the level that the fake poor will find difficult to meet and, therefore, 
will not be eligible for the benefit. Note that when 𝑠𝑛 = 0, there is no shock in period 𝑛.  
From equation (2), there are some points worth discussing. Firstly, in order for the 
condition to hold, it is assumed that 
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛 ≠
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛. Secondly, given that 
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ < 0 and 𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛 > 0, it is clear that government spending 𝐺𝑛 has negative relation to 
the level of electricity of fake poor 𝑒𝑛: an incremental increase in government spending should 
be followed by a reduction in the required level of electricity usage to prevent more fake poor 
from participating in the welfare benefit programs by 
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑔𝑛
(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)
. The 
same effect is also observed from a change in level of benefit for the true poor 𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛): an 
incremental increase in the benefit should be followed by a reduction in the required level of 
electricity usage by 
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ 𝜋𝑛
(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)
. Additionally, an incremental increase 
in the tax rate for fake poor 𝜏𝑛 should also be followed by a reduction of the required level of 
electricity usage by 
−
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛−𝐷0(1+𝑖)
𝑛−𝜋𝑛(𝜑𝑛+𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛+𝐴0(1+𝑖)
𝑛)−𝜋𝑛(𝜏𝑛(𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛−𝛾𝑛
ℎ)+𝜏𝑛(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))]
(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)2(1+𝑠𝑛)
. 
Now, substituting condition (2) into individual budget constraint and assuming that 
𝑏𝑛(𝑟𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑟𝑛, 𝑒𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑛) = 𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛) give the optimal cutoff level of required-hour of fake poor 
usage in period 𝑛, 𝑟𝑛, is as follows: 
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∑ 𝑟𝑛
∞
𝑛=0 =
(1+𝑖)𝑛𝐴0
∑ (1−𝜏𝑛)
∞
𝑛=0 (1+𝑠𝑛)𝑚𝑛
− ∑ [
𝑝
𝑥𝑛
′ (𝑥𝑛
′ +𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ )−(1−𝜏𝑛)(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
−𝛾𝑛
ℎ−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛)
(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)𝑚𝑛
] +∞𝑛=0
∑
𝑝𝑒𝑛
(1−𝜏𝑛)𝑚𝑛
∞
𝑛=0 ∗
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛−𝐷0(1+𝑖)
𝑛−𝜋𝑛(𝜑𝑛+𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛+𝐴0(1+𝑖)
𝑛)−𝜋𝑛(𝜏𝑛(𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛−𝛾𝑛
ℎ)+𝜏𝑛(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))]
(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)
−
∑ [
𝛾𝑛
ℎ
(1+𝑠𝑛)𝑚𝑛
]∞𝑛=0 + ∑ [
(𝐻𝑛−𝑙𝑛) 
(1+𝑠𝑛)
]∞𝑛=0           (3) 
 
Optimality condition (3) gives a formulation of the level of required-hour in period 𝑛 that 
an applicant needs to meet in order to be eligible. Again, this is the level that will prevent fake 
poor from procrastinating and that the fake poor will find difficult to meet. From condition (3), it 
is clear that an incremental increase in government spending should be followed by a reduction 
in the sum of required-hour ∑ 𝑟𝑛
∞
𝑛=0 . However, an incremental increase in tax rate of fake poor 
has an ambiguous effect on the sum of required-hour. An incremental increase in level of benefit 
for the true poor 𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛) should be followed by an increase in the sum of the required-hour. In 
sum, an incremental increase in the variables like government spending, tax rate of fake poor and 
benefit level of true poor should be followed by a reduction in the level electricity usage and an 
increase in the level of required-hour. That said, the highest increase in those variables will be 
followed by a reduction to the lowest level of electricity usage and by an increase to the highest 
level of required-hour. Analogously, the lowest reduction in those variables will be followed by 
an increase to the highest level of electricity usage and by a reduction to the lowest level of 
required-hour. Therefore, this provides the boundaries of required-hour and electricity level as 
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well as the variables mentioned above. The optimal levels of electricity level (2) and required-
hour (3) are located within these boundaries. 
 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Jurisdiction differential in net benefit might induce a migration from a low to a high net 
benefit jurisdiction. Likewise, individuals might choose to procrastinate on the application 
process if they found that applying later could give higher net benefit than applying now. As a 
result, these migration and procrastination behaviors created information asymmetry problem. 
Using a signaling game model that incorporated these behaviors, I provided a solution to this 
problem. There were two signals used in this paper, namely, required-hour and electricity usage. 
When migration was the driving factor of information asymmetry problem, there should be a 
condition that might prevent the individuals from seeking benefit in other jurisdictions. The 
condition should be such that 
[
𝜎2𝑚𝑏
2
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
]
𝑖𝑗
[
𝜎2𝑚𝑏
𝑒(𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑟
⁄ 𝑃𝑒−
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
⁄ 𝑚)
]
𝑖𝑘 = 𝑏
𝑖𝑘
− 𝑐
𝑗,𝑘
. The left hand side is the MCB 
ratio. Intuitively, MCB ratio should equal to post migration net benefit (i.e. the benefit in 
jurisdiction 𝑘 minus the migration cost). The result suggested that government in jurisdiction 𝑘 
made a policy by choosing a particular level of electricity usage and time so that the resulting 
MCB, i.e. 𝜎4, could equalize the MCB ratio and post migration net benefit. I called this an inter-
jurisdictional adjustment policy: an adjustment was made so that a particular jurisdiction’s policy 
accounted other jurisdiction’s policy. Here, the role of federal government was necessary to 
coordinate and ease the adjustment policy by providing information and establishing an 
agreement between two jurisdictions or by helping in making the adjustment. For example, if the 
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MCB in jurisdiction 𝑗 was too low to equalize both sides of equation (1), government in 
jurisdiction 𝑘 should lower its MCB. In some cases, it might be too low to go. In these cases, 
federal government might help either increase the MCB in jurisdiction 𝑗 or decrease the MCB in 
jurisdiction 𝑘. 
On the other hand, when procrastination was the driving factor of information 
asymmetry, there should be a condition that prevented individuals from postponing the 
application in order to get a better net benefit. There were two conditions which defined the 
optimal level of cutoffs of two signals. Since fake poor applicant was the one who created the 
information asymmetry, government cared only about the optimal level of cutoff that 
government should impose on the fake poor in order to prevent them from engaging in a strategic 
behavior. The fake poor optimal level of cutoff of electricity usage was  
𝑒𝑛 =
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛−𝐷0(1+𝑖)
𝑛−𝜋𝑛(𝜑𝑛+𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛+𝐴0(1+𝑖)
𝑛)−𝜋𝑛(𝜏𝑛(𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛−𝛾𝑛
ℎ)+𝜏𝑛(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))]
(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)
. 
The optimal level above gave a formulation of the required level of electricity usage in 
period 𝑛 that any applicant needed to meet in order to be eligible. However, this was the level 
that the fake poor would find difficult to meet and that would prevent fake poor from 
procrastinating given the characteristics of fake poor, true poor and government. Note that when 
𝑠𝑛 = 0, there was no shock in period 𝑛. On the other hand, the fake poor optimal level of cutoff 
of required-hour was ∑ 𝑟𝑛
∞
𝑛=0 =
(1+𝑖)𝑛𝐴0
∑ (1−𝜏𝑛)
∞
𝑛=0 (1+𝑠𝑛)𝑚𝑛
−
∑ [
𝑝
𝑥𝑛
′ (𝑥𝑛
′ +𝑠𝑛𝑥𝑛
′ )−(1−𝜏𝑛)(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
−𝛾𝑛
ℎ−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛)
(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)𝑚𝑛
] + ∑
𝑝𝑒𝑛
(1−𝜏𝑛)𝑚𝑛
∞
𝑛=0
∞
𝑛=0 ∗
𝜗2𝑛𝑚𝑛
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑦𝑛
⁄ [𝑃𝑔𝑛𝐺𝑛−𝐷0(1+𝑖)
𝑛−𝜋𝑛(𝜑𝑛+𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛+𝐴0(1+𝑖)
𝑛)−𝜋𝑛(𝜏𝑛(𝑚𝑛ℎ𝑛−𝛾𝑛
ℎ)+𝜏𝑛(𝜑𝑛−𝛾𝑛
𝜑
)−𝑏𝑛(𝑦𝑛))]
(
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑟𝑛
⁄ 𝑃𝑒𝑛−
𝜕𝑏𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑛
⁄ 𝑚𝑛)∆1𝑛(1−𝜏𝑛)(1+𝑠𝑛)
−
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∑ [
𝛾𝑛
ℎ
(1+𝑠𝑛)𝑚𝑛
]∞𝑛=0 + ∑ [
(𝐻𝑛−𝑙𝑛) 
(1+𝑠𝑛)
]∞𝑛=0 .  This was the level that would prevent fake poor from 
procrastinating.  
Despite the solution the model provides, the study has some drawbacks. Although the 
study has shown that there are boundaries of required-hour and electricity usage, the study has 
not provided the equation of the lower bound and upper bound. Therefore, further analysis is 
necessary if these boundaries are somewhat important. Additionally, further investigation is also 
needed to find a solution that accounts for both inter-jurisdiction and dynamic problems at the 
same time. Lastly, assumption 3, the types of individuals are fixed throughout the periods on 
welfare only when a zero shock happens in these periods, can be a starting point to analysis that 
account for the change in types throughout the periods where the lifetime utility accounts for 
utility in periods when individuals are of one type and when they are of the other type. In 
particular, the study can be extended to the analysis of lifetime utility that is a function of 
optimal signals chosen by the individuals when they are of one type and other optimal signals 
when the same individuals are of the other type. To see this, suppose that their circumstances in 
period 1 make them ineligible for the benefit and decide to opt out. In period 𝑛 − 1, their 
circumstances change but still make them ineligible so they decide to opt out. However, if the 
changes are the ones that can make them eligible, they decide to opt in. Hence, the policies 
should be such that whenever the individuals have better circumstances than the true poor, the 
policies induce them to opt out. For example, as shown later, whenever their electricity usage is 
at a level higher than the government’s cutoff, they decide to opt out since they will have a lower 
utility level if they insist on applying. Therefore, unless individuals can provide proofs that they 
have substantial change in income or assets; when the fake poor insist on applying, say, in the 
first period, their lifetime utility gets lower due to a lower utility received in the first period. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONDITIONAL DOUBLE-SIGNAL APPROACH AS AN EFFICIENT 
APPROACH TO WELFARE BENEFIT TARGETING 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Due to inability of a government to completely observe the income of welfare benefit 
applicants, the government often faced information asymmetry problem. The government found 
it difficult to separate the applicants who were truly eligible and those who were not. Economic 
literatures had attempted to mitigate this problem by using a traditional ordeal mechanism. They 
found that imposing ordeals on the applicants could help solve the information asymmetry 
problem so that the government could direct the benefit to the most-needy. This resulted in a 
better targeting efficiency since the ordeals helped exclude the non-eligible applicants. However, 
they risked the benefit take-up rate after a portion of eligible applicants was also being excluded. 
Many truly eligible applicants decided to turn down the benefit program. The applicants made 
this decision after, as assumed by a standard economic theory, they realized that there was a cost 
associated with the program participation (Moffitt, 1983) and ordeals created this cost (Alatas et 
al., 2013; Blumkin, Margalioth, & Sadka, 2010; Nichols & Zeckhauser, 1982). Shortly speaking, 
there was a fundamental trade-off between benefit take-up rate and targeting efficiency.  
Low take-up rates could be clearly observed in welfare programs. For example, Trippe 
and Doyle (1992) showed that approximately 50 percent of households eligible for the food 
stamp program (FSP) did not participate in the program. Blank and Ruggles (1996) found that 
single mothers used Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and FSP in only 62 to 70 
percent of the months in which they were eligible. Additionally, Kim and Mergoupis (1997) 
estimated that only 32 percent of eligible families participated in FSP among the working poor. 
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J. Currie (2003) showed that, among eligible families with children aged one to five, the take-up 
of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) was 
just 38 percent. J. Currie and Gahvari (2008) also pointed out that among newly eligible children, 
the take-up rates ranged from 8 to 14 percent while take-up rates of US public health insurance 
programs for child ranged from 35 to 40 percent. That said, adding more ordeals or increasing 
the required level of the ordeal was not an efficient solution to this asymmetry problem.  
On the other hand, this study attempts to provide an efficient solution by incorporating 
the basic premise underlying the traditional ordeal to separate the eligible applicants from the 
non-eligible ones and by accounting the take-up ratio in the model to anticipate the potential 
take-up reduction. This study benefits from using the signaling game model and employs two 
ordeals which are called double signals. The signals are application time and essential 
component. Application time refers to how much time an applicant can spend in the process of 
applying; while essential component refers to a good or service that an applicant must inevitably 
consume in a particular geographic area or shelter. The essential component used in this study is 
electricity usage. The model proposed in this paper is then called as conditional double-signal 
(CDS) model, that is, double-signal signaling game model conditioning on take-up rate.  
In line with that, this study designs potential cutoffs of each signal that the government 
can use as the required level of signals in order to separate the eligible applicants from the non-
eligible ones. For simplicity, I call the eligible applicants as true poor and non-eligible ones as 
fake poor. The fake poor are those whose income levels are slightly above the eligibility 
threshold of income (i.e. marginal individuals). Gruber (2009) shows that welfare benefit gives 
incentive to these individuals to reduce labor and increase more leisure when they find that the 
benefit increases their utility without having to maintain the same labor supply. The result of this 
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study provides enormous options of cutoff a government can impose so that any take-up rate that 
the government desires can be achieved or maintained. Additionally, since there are many 
possible combinations of cutoff associated to a particular take-up rate, true poor applicants with 
different levels of signal can still be eligible for the benefit as long as their levers of signals 
satisfy the combination of cutoff. Therefore, the take-up rate will improve. 
This study contributes to the literatures in four respects. Firstly, this study takes initial 
steps toward modeling the information asymmetry within the welfare programs accounting for 
the take-up rate (so called conditional double-signal model). Secondly, the model provides a 
guidance to the government in constructing the benefit eligibility. Thirdly, this study provides 
enormous options of cutoff a government can impose so that any take-up rate that the 
government desires can be achieved or maintained. Fourthly, this study provides a simulation of 
the conditional double-signal model to analyze the importance of conditional double signals in 
determining the size of cutoffs, evaluating its impact on the take-up rate, and evaluating the 
impact of size of benefit on the take-up rate. This study attempts to address the following 
research questions: What is the effect of increasing the cutoff level of one signal (either time or 
electricity usage) on the number of true poor and take-up rate? Using a simulation of conditional 
double-signal approach, what is the optimal level of cutoffs? How can a government maintain or 
achieve a particular take-up rate in the presence of information asymmetry? The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the literature review. Section III describes the 
models. Section IV presents a simulation based on the model. Section V provides the concluding 
remarks. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In many cases, low take-up rate had been a consequence of self-targeting welfare 
programs (J. Currie & Gahvari, 2008; Jacoby, 1997). Take-up rate was the ratio between the 
number of benefit recipients and the total number of eligible individuals. Take-up rates below 
100 percent indicated that some of those who were entitled to a welfare program were not 
receiving it (Hernanz, Malherbet, & Pellizzari, 2004).  
There were many reasons that could explain the low take-up. Based on his findings, 
Jacoby (1997) emphasized that households found the benefit unattractive since they valued it less 
than the cost of provision. The other reason was due to ordeals imposition. J. Currie and Gahvari 
(2008), Jacoby (1997), and Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2004) agreed that the ordeals 
that were imposed to improve the targeting had, instead, discouraged the right people so the 
benefit became unattractive. Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) were among other economists that 
traded the take-up for the targeting. They pointed out that complexity and administration (which 
acted as ordeals) seemed to be very important for the effects of public policies in general, and for 
the take-up of social benefits in particular. Taking initial steps toward modeling and analyzing 
the complexity in public programs, they argued that if government concerned the poverty 
alleviation, imposing complex take-up rules would give a better signal of true eligibility although 
it reduced take-up.  
On the other hand, a study by Shuptrine, Grant, and McKenzie (1998) emphasized that 
the non-participation of deserving individuals was due to lack of understanding about the 
program. They found that 76 percent of individuals did not understand the Medicaid program, 
and as compared to child care, EIC, and FSP, Medicaid was judged to be the least understood 
benefit available to recipients when they left welfare for work. This finding was also in line with 
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a study by Perry, Kannel, Valdez, and Chang (2000) that highlighted the low participation due to 
reasons like lack of know-how and the perceived hassle of Medicaid. Ellwood and Kenney 
(1995) stated that many eligible pregnant women failed to get the prenatal care benefits. 
Additionally, according to Craig (1991) and J. M. Currie (2008), the take-up in many U.K 
programs was less than full take-up. A study by Dixon, Le Grand, Henderson, Murray, and 
Poteliakhoff (2003), which was also discussed in J. Currie and Gahvari (2008), mentioned that 
possible factors that explained the low take-up rate might include high transportation costs (e.g. 
lack of transportation or inability to take time off from work), superior connection and 
communication skills and/or better rapport with medical providers, and differences to attitudes 
toward illness and medical care. Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) added that complexity of welfare 
programs that should be responsible for the low take-up rate might result from detailed eligibility 
criteria, rigorous documentation requirements, difficult and time-consuming forms, or multiple 
trips to the welfare office for interviewing and testing, and recertification to continue to receive 
the benefit. Thompson (1994) said that due to this complexity, there was a big loss of fraction of 
the population that the means-tested were intended to serve. Applicants were also frequently 
rejected because they failed to fulfill the administrative requirements within the required time. 
Other studies including J. Currie, Grogger, Burtless, and Schoeni (2001), Bitler, Currie, and 
Scholz (2003), Daly and Burkhauser (2003), Stuber and Kronebusch (2004), and Aizer (2007) 
also discussed the low take-up rate. 
Nevertheless, large number of recipients did not necessarily indicate that the targeting 
device of the program had worked well. One might examine thoroughly that the take-up rate 
might be low. If the program led to an increase in the take-up of welfare programs then the 
program was more efficient than if the program led to an increase in total recipients. The latter 
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phenomena might show the existence of crowding-out which had been studied, for example, by 
J. Currie and Gahvari (2008), Gruber and Simon (2007), and Olsen (2003). Without enough 
information about which individuals were in the true poor or fake poor groups, low take-up rate 
and crowding-out might be something that one could commonly observe. The true poor group 
consisted of applicants who, outside the programs, would otherwise have been unable to get the 
same level of payoff as the one derived in welfare programs (e.g. public insurance vs. private 
insurance, welfare-based spending on food vs. personal-based spending on food, etc.), while the 
fake poor group consisted of applicants who, outside the programs, could otherwise maintain the 
same payoff without the welfare benefits. 
At least, there were two channels that ended up in low take-up rate. The first was that the 
applicants gave up due to the barriers resulting from ordeals (direct effect). The second was 
through labor supply response (indirect effect). Saez (2002) stated that ordeals made individuals 
choose to work instead of applying which then reduced the take-up. However, this study did not 
attempt to analyze these channels in detail.  
 
III.  THE MODELS 
Consider the signaling game of welfare benefit described in section IV of chapter I which 
was represented as a 6-tuple ℊ = {𝑇, (𝑟, 𝑒), 𝑏, 𝜌, 𝑈, 𝑊} and consisted of two players, a sender (S) 
which is drawn from a group of welfare applicants with two types, and a receiver (R) which is a 
government; and specifies a space of the sender’s type 𝑇 = {𝑡, 𝑡̅}, a space of sender’s signal  𝜁 =
{𝑟, 𝑒} which are the required-hour (i.e. time) 𝑟 and electricity usage as the essential component 𝑒, 
a space of receiver’s action 𝑏, a prior probability 𝜌 that S is of type 𝑡 (so called true poor, 
otherwise fake poor 𝑡̅) where 𝜌(𝑡) ∈ [0,1) and ∑ 𝜌(𝑡)𝑡 = 1, a payoff function of senders 𝑈, and 
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a payoff function of receiver 𝑊. Any variable 𝑣 and ?̅? are associated to 𝑡 and 𝑡̅ types of S 
respectively, that is 𝑣 = 𝑣(𝑡) and ?̅? = 𝑣(𝑡)̅. 
To start the analyses, I need to solve the optimal cutoffs of electricity usage and time. 
Suppose that both types of applicant maximize 𝑈(𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 +
𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒), particularly true poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 and fake poor applicant maximizes 𝑈 
subjects to their respective budget constraint (1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) −
𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝑝𝑒𝑒, where 𝐻 = 𝑙 + ℎ + 𝑟; 𝜎1 + 𝜎2 + 𝜎3 + 𝜎4 = 1; 𝑦
′ =
(1 − 𝜏)(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) + 𝛾𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)(𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝛾ℎ = (1 − 𝜏)𝜑 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑚ℎ + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ =
(1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ is the total income which is the sum of the first-best total income and the 
missing potential tax liabilities, 𝜏𝛾𝜑 + 𝜏𝛾ℎ. Government maximizes its payoff function 𝑊 =
𝑊(𝐺, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜌𝑈(. ) + (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(. ) subjects to government budget constraint 
𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) + 𝜏 (𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) + 𝜋 (𝜏 (𝑚(𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑟) − 𝛾ℎ) +
𝜏(𝜑 −  𝛾𝜑) − 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) − 𝑃𝑔𝐺 ≥ 0; first individual rationality (IR1) 𝑈 (𝑥
′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) =
𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) ≥ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞; second individual rationality (IR2) 
𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) ≤ 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑙) = 𝑈
𝑞
; first incentive 
compatibility (IC1) 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) = 𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥
′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 +
𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒); second incentive compatibility (IC2) 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒)) ≥ 𝑈 (𝑥′, 𝑒, 𝑙, 𝑏(𝑟)) =
𝜎1𝑙𝑛𝑥′ + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑒 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑛𝑙 + 𝜎4𝑙𝑛𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒), where 𝑈
𝑞 and 𝑈
𝑞
 are constants, 𝜌 is the probability that 
the applicant is a true poor individual, 𝜋 ∈ (0,1) is the number of true poor and 𝜋 = 1 − 𝜋 ∈
(0,1) is the number of fake poor. When 𝜋 = 0.9, the number of true poor receiving the benefit is 
90% of all true poor. IR constraint is to ensure that the payoff from applying should be at least as 
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high as that from not applying in order to encourage the true poor to participate in the welfare 
program, while it is the opposite for the fake poor. IR1 and IC2 constraints are binding while IR2 
and IC1 are not binding (i.e. setting lagrange multipliers associated to IR2 and IC1 equal to 0 and 
to IR1 and IC2 equal to positive values). The applicant’s budget constraint can be written as 𝜑 +
𝑚ℎ − 𝑝𝑒𝑒 = 𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′ + 𝜏(𝜑 − 𝛾𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝛾ℎ) − 𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒). Taking the first derivatives of 𝑊 with 
respect to 𝜏, 𝜏, 𝑒, 𝑒, 𝑟, and 𝑟 give the optimal cutoffs of 𝑒, 𝑒, 𝑟, and 𝑟. The first derivative of 𝑊 
with respect to 𝜏 and 𝑒 gives 𝜎4 (
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
) +
𝜎2𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒
=
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜎1
𝜌
(
𝑝𝑒𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝑝𝑒𝑒)−𝜋(𝜏𝑚ℎ−𝜏𝛾ℎ+𝜏𝜑−𝜏𝛾𝜑−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))
). Substituting 𝜑 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝑝𝑒𝑒 from 
applicant’s budget constraint and rearranging gives 
𝜎2𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒
=
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜎1
𝜌
(
𝑝𝑒𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))−𝜋(𝜏𝑚ℎ−𝜏𝛾ℎ+𝜏𝜑−𝜏𝛾𝜑−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))
) − 𝜎4 (
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
). Therefore 
the optimal cutoff of 𝑒 is 𝑒∗ =
𝜎2𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜎1
𝜌
(
𝑝𝑒𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝑝𝑥′
𝑥′+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))−𝜋(𝜏𝑚ℎ−𝜏𝛾ℎ+𝜏𝜑−𝜏𝛾𝜑−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))
)−𝜎4(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
)
 which can be written as 
𝑒∗ =
𝜌𝜎2𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)(𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))−𝜋(𝜏𝑚ℎ−𝜏𝛾ℎ+𝜏𝜑−𝜏𝛾𝜑−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)))
𝜋(1−𝜌)𝜎1𝑝𝑒𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)−𝜌𝜎4(
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
)(𝑃𝑔𝐺−𝜋(𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))−𝜋(𝜏𝑚ℎ−𝜏𝛾ℎ+𝜏𝜑−𝜏𝛾𝜑−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)))
 (1) 
Analogously, 𝑒 is similar to condition (1) except upper bars and lower bars are replaced 
with lower bars and upper bars respectively. The optimal cutoff of 𝑟, and 𝑟 can be found using 
the same method. However, before trusting the condition (1), I need to test the accuracy of the 
condition first by solving for the optimal take-up rate condition, simulating the condition and 
comparing the result to other’s finding. Therefore, solving condition (1) for 𝜋 gives the optimal 
number of true poor: 
84 
 
𝜋∗ =
𝜌𝑃𝑔𝐺
(1−𝜌)𝜎1𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)+𝜌𝜎4𝑒
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
(𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ))−𝜌𝜎4𝑒𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
+𝜌𝜎2𝑏(𝑟,𝑒)(𝑝𝑥′𝑥
′+𝜏(𝜑−𝛾𝜑+𝑚ℎ−𝛾ℎ)−𝑏(𝑟,𝑒))
∗
(𝜎4𝑒
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑒
+ 𝜎2𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒))           (2)  
The optimal number of fake poor 𝜋∗ is given by 1 − 𝜋∗. Since the number of true poor shown in 
equation (2) is in percentage and the take-up rate is given by 
𝜋
𝜋+𝜋
, equation (2) also yields the 
optimal take-up rate. While it is clear that changing the level of required-hour will have an 
indirect effect on the number of true poor receiving the benefit through the level of benefit, 
equation (2) suggests that an increase in electricity usage will result in an ambiguous change of 
number of true poor. To have a deeper examination of the effect of the level of required-hour and 
the electricity usage, this study conducts a simulation. 
 
IV.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: A SIMULATION 
Having derived the optimal number of fake poor, the next analysis is to predict the take-
up rate across states in the United States. In this study, I use 2013 state level data from various 
sources for all variables and parameters in equation (2). Government spending 𝐺 and benefit 
𝑏(𝑟, 𝑒) = 𝑏 data are from usgovernmentspending.com, electricity usage 𝑒 data is from eia.gov, 
private consumption 𝑥′ is calculated based on fake poor’s budget constraint, tax rate 𝜏 data is 
from taxfoundation.org, income level 𝑚ℎ data is based on income eligibility for household size 3 
from benefits.gov. Household size 3 is used due to the fact that average of household size in the 
U.S. is 2.58 according to census.gov.23 The household size is then rounded up from 2.58 to 3. 
                                                 
23 http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf 
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Additionally, in order to establish a simple benchmark the following are assumed: there is no tax 
evasion behavior, belief is 0.9, marginal contribution of other goods and electricity is 524, the 
wage rate is based on living wage rate25, total application time needed is 15 hours for every 
recertification/application process26, income level 𝑚ℎ is based on the highest eligible income 
level to get either Food Assistance or WIC27. Yearly electricity usage is calculated based on 
Table CE1.1 from eia.gov. The take-up rate that I will use to compare is the one estimated by 
Gabe (2013), which is 74%. 
To examine how adjustment in level of electricity usage and time affect the take-up rate, I 
conduct a simulation. This simulation also helps this study predict the take-up rate across states 
in the U.S. In this simulation, the level of electricity usage is adjusted based on the average usage 
of an income range. The reason is that electricity usage is correlated to income. If one requires an 
individual to present a specific usage level which is not associated to his income level, it will 
cause any kinds of inconvenience to him. The usage level for each income level is presented in 
column (5) of table 3.1. For example, if individual A has income within $20,000 to $39,000 
range, his estimated average usage is 4,148.18 kWh. If one intends to exclude individual A from 
a program, one may require him to have electricity usage that is associated to income one range 
lower (i.e. 4,347.16 kWh). 
 
 
                                                 
24 Any value can be chosen since the effect of changing the value will not substantially affect the take-up. 
25 Living wage rate is taken from http://livingwage.mit.edu/ 
26 This covers the time an applicant spends to understand the program application, fulfill the requirements, do the 
application, travel to and from welfare office, be interviewed, and other related activities. 
27 Food assistance and WIC programs clearly describe the eligible income levels and among the programs that 
require a particular income level, food assistance and WIC programs have the highest eligible income levels which 
may attract fake poor to apply for the benefits. 
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Table 3.1. Estimated Electricity Usage and Weight by Income Range 
Income 
Range 
(1) 
Site Energy 
Consumption 
Per 
Household 
Member 
(million Btu) 
(2) 
Percentage 
of 
electricity 
used 
(3) 
Estimated 
Electricity 
usage only 
Per 
Household 
Member 
(million 
Btu) 
(4) 
Estimated 
Electricity 
usage only 
Per 
Household 
Member 
(kWh) 
(5) 
Estimated 
Electricity 
usage only 
Per 
Household 
Member/ 
month 
(kWh) 
(6) 
Electricity 
weight by 
income 
bracket 
(7) 
Less than 
$20,000 33.5 44.27801 14.83313 4347.162 362.2635 1.552084 
$20,000 to 
$39,999 32.2 43.95707 14.15418 4148.18 345.6816 1.578567 
$40,000 to 
$59,000 32.8 44.41446 14.56794 4269.443 355.7869 2.124268 
$60,000 to 
$79,999 34.6 43.83976 15.16856 4445.465 370.4554 2.619628 
$80,000 to 
$99,999 34.8 42.91667 14.935 4377.016 364.7514 3.193275 
$100,000 to 
$119,999 37.8 40.12346 15.16667 4444.911 370.4093 3.699716 
$120,000 
or more 43.3 39.86146 17.26001 5058.41 421.5342 3.846744 
Note: Percentage of electricity used is calculated based on table CE4.1 from eia.gov28. 
Data in columns 2-6 of table 3.1 shows lack of monotonicity. Two possible explanations 
are that the first row of table 3.1 covers more households than the rest rows29 and that there are 
some factors that may cause a high energy cost per square feet that a low-income household has 
to bear (e.g. low-income households live in a less energy-efficient housing than richer 
households). 
One way to reduce the bias caused by the factors above is by multiplying any necessary 
data in columns 2-6 with a housing weight that accounts the factors. The weight can be generated 
by several methods. Firstly, taking a ratio of spending on energy by income and electricity usage 
                                                 
28 http://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2009/index.cfm?view=consumption#summary 
29 Based on Table 1 of paper by Elwell (2014) “The Distribution of Household Income and the Middle Class” on 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20811.pdf, accessed on July 20, 2015 
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by income. Secondly, if the relationship of housing age and rent rate per square feet is negative, 
the relationship of income and rent per square feet is positive, and the relationship of housing 
electricity usage and housing age is positive, a ratio can be generated by a formula that accounts 
housing age, rent rate per square feet and electricity usage. This study uses the first method and 
the data is from americaspower.org.30  
 
Table 3.2. Weighted Estimated Electricity Usage by Income Range 
Income 
Range 
(1) 
Estimated 
Electricity 
usage only 
Per 
Household 
Member 
(kWh) 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Housing 
weight 
(3) 
Weighted 
Estimated 
Electricity 
usage only 
Per 
Household 
Member 
(kWh) 
(4) 
Less than 
$20,000 4347.162 
 
0.162560539 
 
706.6769965 
$20,000 to 
$39,999 4148.18 
 
0.187879724 
 
779.3589139 
$40,000 to 
$59,000 4269.443 
 
0.21263468 
 
907.8316453 
$60,000 to 
$79,999 4445.465 
 
0.251867333 
 
1119.667415 
$80,000 to 
$99,999 4377.016 
 
0.292991189 
 
1282.427123 
$100,000 to 
$119,999 4444.911 
 
0.315593367 
 
1402.784427 
$120,000 
or more 5058.41 
 
0.322342546 
 
1630.540757 
Source: Table 3.A4  
The idea of using the first ratio is based on the argument of less energy-efficient housing: 
the housing requires more energy usage per square feet than a more energy-efficient housing due 
                                                 
30 Based on table 1 of “Energy Cost Impacts on American Families, 2001-2012” on 
http://www.americaspower.org/sites/default/files/Energy_Cost_Impacts_2012_FINAL.pdf, accessed on July 20, 
2015 
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to ‘energy-efficient factor’ that is attached to every housing. More-efficient housing has smaller 
efficient-bias factor while less-efficient housing has bigger efficient-bias factor. That said, this 
factor adds to total energy usage and total energy spending. Therefore, since energy spending is 
calculated based on energy usage, one way to eliminate the factor is by dividing the energy 
spending with energy usage and this gives the housing weight. After applying the housing 
weight, electricity usage data in column 4 of table 3.2, now, shows monotonicity.  
Now, using the real data from table 3.1, to amplify the effect of this adjustment, one may 
attach an electricity weight (from column (7) of table 3.1) to the usage cutoff. For example, 
4,347.16*1.55, 4,269.44*2.12 or 4,445.46*2.62. The electricity weight for an income range is 
determined based on the lowest income level in the range. An exception is made for the first 
range: the weight is based on the highest income level since the lowest level is zero. The weight 
is determined according to the following equation: 
1 + (
𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
100
).  (3) 
Since government needs to recertify the benefit eligibility in several months basis (e.g. 
every 6 months), the equation uses data of average electricity usage per person per month. In the 
simulation, the model also predicts the take-up rate 𝜋 across states.  
Table 3.3 presents the maximum, minimum and average values of take-up rate across 
states in three settings. The first setting is a benchmark in which no adjustment takes place. Here, 
the estimated mean value of take-up rate is 68.97%. It is close to the total poor receiving benefits 
estimated by Gabe (2013) which is 74%. This is a good sign that the condition (1) can be used 
for further research. The second setting is when the electricity usage of an individual is adjusted. 
The electricity usage is increased by one level of income range. The third setting is when the 
electricity is increased by two levels of income range. In the simulation, the starting range of 
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income that is used as the base is $20,000 to $39,000. It is due to the fact that many eligible 
income levels fall within this range. The associated electricity usage is 4,148.18 kWh. As shown 
in column (1) of table 3.3, the benchmark take-up rate when the cutoff level of electricity usage 
is 4,148.18 kWh is 0.383 at minimum or 0.760 at maximum with mean value of 0.690.  
 
Table 3.3. Changes in Take-Up Rates as Electricity Usage is Adjusted 
  
Benchmark 
Adj. Electricity 1: Using 
electricity of 1 income 
range higher  
Adj. Electricity 2: Using 
electricity of 2 income 
range higher 
𝜋 
benchmark 
(1) 
% Change of 
benchmark 𝜋 
and weighted 
benchmark 𝜋 
(2) 
% Change of 
benchmark 𝜋 
and 𝜋 with 
adj. 
electricity 1 
(3) 
% Change 
of 
benchmark 
𝜋 and 𝜋 
with 
weighted 
adj. 
electricity 1 
(4) 
% Change of 
benchmark 𝜋 
and 𝜋 with 
adj. 
electricity 2 
(5) 
% Change 
of 
benchmark 
𝜋 and 𝜋 
with 
weighted 
adj. 
electricity 
2 
(6) 
Min 
Value 0.383694 -2.54358 -0.12217 -5.62404 -0.30082 -9.23341 
Max 
Value 0.759022 -0.13752 -0.00824 -0.33766 -0.02021 -0.5171 
Mean 
Value 0.689709 -0.38615 -0.02041 -0.85881 -0.04536 -1.30822 
Source: Table 3.A2 
 
The state with the highest take-up rate is Indiana. Meanwhile, District of Columbia has 
the lowest take-up rate. In the benchmark setting the take-up rate of Indiana is 0.76 rate, while 
the rate of District Colombia is 0.38. The average take-up rate is 0.69. States whose take-up rate 
is close to the average include Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon and Utah.  These states have take-up rate between 0.68 and 0.69. Details are 
presented in table 3.A2 in appendix. When the cutoff level of electricity usage is adjusted, the 
take-up rate responds negatively. From column (3) of table 3.3, increasing the electricity usage 
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by one level of income range decreases the take-up rate by 0.122% of the benchmark take-up 
rate at minimum or 0.008% at maximum with mean value of 0.02%. From column (5) of table 
3.3, increasing the electricity usage by two levels of income range decreases the take-up rate by 
0.301% of the benchmark take-up rate at minimum or 0.02% at maximum with mean value of 
0.045%. As shown in column (2), when the electricity usage of an income range is increased by 
the associated weight, the take-up rate decreases by 2.543% of the benchmark take-up rate at 
maximum or 0.137% at minimum. As shown in column (4), when the adjustment is weighted, 
increasing in electricity usage by one level of income range decreases the take-up rate by 5.624% 
of the benchmark take-up rate at maximum or 0.338% at minimum. As shown in column (6), 
when the adjustment is weighted, increasing in electricity usage by two levels of income range 
decreases the take-up rate by 9.233% of the benchmark take-up rate at maximum or 0.517% at 
minimum. 
Overall, when the cutoff level of electricity usage is increased, the take-up rate decreases 
by anywhere between 0.008% and 9.233%. Putting it other way, when the cutoff level of 
electricity usage is decreased, the take-up rate increases by anywhere between 0.008% and 
9.233%. This implies that when the benchmark take-up rate is 0.759 and the increase is 9.233%, 
the take-up rate will increase by 8.513 percentage points. At one end, the increase of 8.513 
percentage points may indicate an increase in number of true poor receiving the benefit by 
8.513% of total eligible applicants at one end. At the other end, it indicates a reduction in number 
of fake poor receiving the benefit by 8.513% of total eligible applicants. Similarly, 8.513% of 
total eligible applicants may be the number of fake poor who are in the welfare program before 
the changes in ordeals take place. 
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Suppose that the eligible income level is $21,000, which is in range of $20,000 to 
$39,999, and there is a fake poor individual with income of $60,000 seeking for the benefit. 
Increasing the cutoff level of electricity by two levels of income range (i.e. from income range of 
$20,000 to $39,999 to income range of $60,000 to $79,999) will allow him to receive the benefit. 
However, if government reduces the cutoff level of electricity usage by two income levels (i.e. 
from income range of $60,000 to $79,999 to income range of $20,000 to $39,999), this 
individual along with other individuals as many as 8.513% of total eligible applicants may not be 
eligible anymore and government may save some of welfare budgets for the true poor. This is the 
case when the starting cutoff level of electricity usage is 4,445.46 kWh which is associated to 
income range of $60,000 to $79,999. Without a cutoff level of electricity usage, the number of 
recipients from the fake poor group may be even higher than 8.513% of total eligible applicants. 
Therefore, imposing a cutoff level of electricity usage will lead to a bigger saving. 
 
Table 3.4. Changes in Take-Up Rates as Required-Hour is Adjusted 
 
▁π 
benchmark 
(1) 
% change 
of 
benchmark 
and adj. 
hour 1 
(2) 
% change 
of 
benchmark 
and adj. 
hour 2 
(3) 
Min 
Value 0.383694 0.011741 0.023474 
Max 
Value 0.759022 0.09344 0.186772 
Mean 
Value 0.689709 0.020232 0.040447 
Source: Table 3.A3 
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Table 3.4 shows the changes in take-up rates as required-hour is adjusted. The adjustment 
in required-hour is made by doubling the required-hour from 15 hours to 30 hours and by tripling 
the hours from 15 hours to 45 hours. It is assumed that the whole process of getting the benefit 
(i.e. from understanding the benefit program to regularly receiving the benefit every few-month 
period) takes 15 hours. 15 hours are the base of the required-hour. The benchmark take-up rate 
associated to this base is shown in column (1) of table 3.4. 
Column (2) of table 3.4 shows that doubling the required-hour leads to a small increase in 
take-up rate by 0.012% at minimum or 0.093% at maximum with mean value of 0.02%, while 
column (3) shows that tripling the required-hour increases the take-up rate by 0.023% at 
minimum or 0.187% at maximum with mean value of 0.04%.  
Table 3.4 clearly shows that adjusting the required-hour does not substantially affect the 
take-up rate. That said, adjusting the cutoff level of electricity usage has much bigger effect on 
the take-up rate than adjusting the required-hour. This implies that time itself is not enough to be 
the only welfare ordeal or eligibility requirement.  
In sum, tables 3.3 and 3.4 suggest that government should impose a particular level of 
required-hour and electricity usage if government aims to achieve a particular level of take-up 
rate in the presence of information asymmetry.  
For example, based on the simulation shown in table 3.5, state of Montana has initial 
take-up rate of 0.710 (column (7)). If the state government wants an increase in take-up rate by 
2.544%, it needs to reduce the electricity usage from 4,148.18 kWh (column (2)) to 2,625.43 
kWh (=4,148.18/1.58). Practically, it will attract more true poor whose electricity usage is at or 
below 2,625.43 kWh. On the other hand, if the government increases the required level of 
electricity usage by a multiplication of the weight of 1.58 from 4,148.18 kWh to 6,554.12 kWh 
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(column (4)), it will attract more fake poor. In turn, the take-up rate will go down from 0.710 to 
0.692 (column (9)). This is a reduction of 2.544% (column (5)).  
 
Table 3.5. Montana Take-up Rate Simulation 
State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Require
d-hour 
benchm
ark (1) 
Electricity benchmark Benchmark 
 
 
 
 
 
Elec. 
Benchm
ark 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Weig
ht 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Weight
ed elec. 
(4) 
% 
Change 
of 
benchm
ark ▁π 
and 
weighte
d 
benchm
ark ▁π 
(5) 
¯π 
benchm
ark 
(6) 
▁π 
benchm
ark 
(7) 
¯π 
weighte
d 
benchm
ark 
(8) 
▁π 
weighte
d 
benchm
ark 
(9) 
Montana 15 4148.18 1.58 
6554.1
2 -2.544 0.290 0.710 0.308 0.692 
Source: Table 3.A1 
 
In addition to adjusting the electricity usage as shown in the example, a government may 
adjust the required-hour in order to fine-tune the eligibility requirement. This provides more 
flexibilities to a government in obtaining the desired take-up-rate than adjusting a single 
requirement. That said, double-signal approach is an efficient approach to welfare benefit 
targeting since it provides more flexibilities and, most importantly, may not only lead to an 
increase in total recipients but also in take-up rate. Additionally, fine-tuning the eligibility 
requirement also means that the government adjusts the cost that an applicant may bear to make 
it not too costly to true poor.  
All tables have shown the effectiveness of having the signals in affecting the take-up rate. 
It has also been shown that increasing ordeals, indeed, reduce the take up rate. Therefore, the 
solution is to take the take-up rate as the condition in assigning the level of ordeals as shown in 
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condition (1). This way may help government design the cutoff level of ordeals given a particular 
take-up rate desired. 
 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using the double-signal model and 2013 U.S. state level data, I do a take-up rate 
simulation in order to predict the take-up rate of each state based on the model that I have 
developed in chapter 1. Based on the simulation, the study predicts that state with the highest 
take-up rate is Indiana. Meanwhile District of Columbia has the lowest take-up rate. In the 
benchmark setting, the take-up rate of Indiana is 0.76, while the rate of District Colombia is 0.38. 
The average take-up rate is 0.69. It is close to the total poor receiving benefits estimated by Gabe 
(2013) which is 74%. This is a good sign that the condition (1) can be used for further research. 
States whose take-up rate is close to the average include Colorado, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon and Utah.  These states have take-up 
rate between 0.68 and 0.69. Overall, when the cutoff level of electricity usage is increased, the 
take-up rate decreases by anywhere between 0.008% and 9.233%. Putting it other way, when the 
cutoff level of electricity usage is decreased, the take-up rate increases by anywhere between 
0.008% and 9.233%. This implies that when the benchmark take-up rate is 0.759 and the 
increase is 9.233%, take-up rate will increase by 8.513 percentage points. The increase of 8.513 
percentage points may indicate an increase in number true poor receiving the benefit by 8.513% 
of total eligible applicants at one end or a reduction in number of fake poor receiving the benefit 
by 8.513% of total eligible applicants at the other end. Similarly, 8.513% of total eligible 
applicants may be the number of fake poor who are in the welfare program before the changes in 
ordeals takes place.  
95 
 
Unlike electricity usage, required-hour has small impacts on the take-up rate. Increasing 
the required-hour leads to a small increase in the take-up rate by anywhere from 0.012% to 
0.187%. This shed some light on what particular cutoff level of ordeals a government should 
impose so that it does not harm the targeted take-up rates. In contrast, it helps government 
achieve a particular level of take-up rate in the presence of information asymmetry.  
Time and electricity can still be devices to differentiate the true poor from the fake poor. 
Although both devices contribute to a better take-up rate, both have, by far, different degree of 
contribution. Decreasing the cutoff level of electricity usage has much bigger impact on the take-
up rate than increasing the required-hour in excluding the fake poor from benefit programs. This 
simply implies that having time as the only device may not result in an efficient way to welfare 
benefit targeting since it is costly to the individual but does not benefit the government as much. 
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APPENDIX 
a. Table 3.A1. Various Possible Cutoffs of Required-Hour and Electricity Usage across States 
State r  
Adj. 
r1 
Adj. 
r2 
electricity benchmark adj. electricity 1 adj. electricity 2 
elec. 
benchmark 
weight 
weighted 
elec. 
adj. 
elec. 1 
weight 
weighted 
adj. elec. 
1 
adj. 
elec. 2 
weight 
weighted 
adj elec. 2 
Alabama 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Alaska 15 30 45 4269.44 2.12 9051.21 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 4377.02 3.19 13977.02 
Arizona 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Arkansas 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
California 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Colorado 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Connecticut 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Delaware 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
District of 
Columbia 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Florida 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Georgia 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Hawaii 15 30 45 4269.44 2.12 9051.21 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 4377.02 3.19 13977.02 
Idaho 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Illinois 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Indiana 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Iowa 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Kansas 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Kentucky 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Louisiana 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Maine 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Maryland 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Massachusetts 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
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Michigan 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Minnesota 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Mississippi 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Missouri 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Montana 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Nebraska 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Nevada 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
New 
Hampshire 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
New Jersey 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
New Mexico 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
New York 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
North 
Carolina 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
North Dakota 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Ohio 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Oklahoma 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Oregon 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Pennsylvania 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Rhode Island 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
South 
Carolina 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
South Dakota 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Tennessee 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Texas 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Utah 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Vermont 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Virginia 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Washington 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
West Virginia 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Wisconsin 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
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Wyoming 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 
Min Value 15 30 45 4148.18 1.58 6554.12 4269.44 2.12 9069.44 4377.02 2.62 11645.47 
Max Value 15 30 45 4269.44 2.12 9051.21 4445.47 2.62 11645.47 4445.47 3.19 13977.02 
Mean Value 15 30 45 4152.93 1.60 6652.05 4276.35 2.14 9170.46 4442.78 2.64 11736.90 
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b. Table 3.A2. Predicted Take-Up across States in the U.S: Adjusting the Cutoff Level of Electricity Usage 
State 
Benchmark 
Adj. Electricity 1: Using electricity of 1 income 
level higher 
Adj. Electricity 2: Using electricity of 2 income 
levels higher 
% 
Chan
ge of 
bench
mark 
▁π 
and 
weigh
ted 
bench
mark 
▁π 
(1) 
¯π 
bench
mark 
(2) 
▁π 
bench
mark 
(3) 
¯π 
weigh
ted 
bench
mark 
(4) 
▁π 
weigh
ted 
bench
mark 
(5) 
% 
Chan
ge of 
bench
mark 
▁π 
and 
▁π 
with 
adj. 
electri
city 1 
(6) 
% 
Chan
ge of 
bench
mark 
▁π 
and 
▁π 
with 
weigh
ted 
adj. 
electri
city 1 
(7) 
¯π 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
1 
(8) 
▁π 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
1 
(9) 
¯π 
weig
hted 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
1  
(10) 
▁π 
weig
hted 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
1 
(11) 
% 
Chan
ge of 
bench
mark 
▁π 
and 
▁π 
with 
adj. 
electri
city 2 
(12) 
% 
Chan
ge of 
bench
mark 
▁π 
and 
▁π 
with 
weigh
ted 
adj. 
electri
city 2 
(13) 
¯π 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
2  
(14) 
▁π 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
2 
(15) 
¯π 
weig
hted 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
2  
(16) 
▁π 
weig
hted 
with 
adj. 
electr
icity 
2 
(17) 
Alabam
a -0.197 0.266 0.734 0.267 0.733 -0.011 -0.464 0.266 0.734 0.269 0.731 -0.028 -0.712 0.266 0.734 0.271 0.729 
Alaska -1.792 0.534 0.466 0.542 0.458 -0.072 -3.087 0.534 0.466 0.548 0.452 -0.044 -4.097 0.534 0.466 0.553 0.447 
Arizona -0.212 0.273 0.727 0.275 0.725 -0.012 -0.505 0.273 0.727 0.277 0.723 -0.030 -0.775 0.274 0.726 0.279 0.721 
Arkansa
s -0.152 0.249 0.751 0.251 0.749 -0.009 -0.364 0.249 0.751 0.252 0.748 -0.022 -0.557 0.250 0.750 0.254 0.746 
Californ
ia -0.500 0.367 0.633 0.370 0.630 -0.028 -1.155 0.367 0.633 0.374 0.626 -0.069 -1.779 0.367 0.633 0.378 0.622 
Colorad
o -0.279 0.319 0.681 0.320 0.680 -0.016 -0.656 0.319 0.681 0.323 0.677 -0.039 -1.007 0.319 0.681 0.325 0.675 
Connect
icut -0.507 0.345 0.655 0.349 0.651 -0.028 -1.152 0.345 0.655 0.353 0.647 -0.068 -1.775 0.346 0.654 0.357 0.643 
Delawar
e -0.397 0.378 0.622 0.380 0.620 -0.023 -0.942 0.378 0.622 0.383 0.617 -0.056 -1.447 0.378 0.622 0.387 0.613 
District 
of 
Columb
ia -0.893 0.616 0.384 0.620 0.380 -0.055 -2.276 0.617 0.383 0.625 0.375 -0.136 -3.493 0.617 0.383 0.630 0.370 
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Florida -0.178 0.251 0.749 0.252 0.748 -0.010 -0.428 0.251 0.749 0.254 0.746 -0.026 -0.656 0.251 0.749 0.256 0.744 
Georgia -0.191 0.266 0.734 0.267 0.733 -0.011 -0.460 0.266 0.734 0.269 0.731 -0.027 -0.706 0.266 0.734 0.271 0.729 
Hawaii -1.570 0.296 0.704 0.307 0.693 -0.059 -2.628 0.296 0.704 0.314 0.686 -0.036 -3.528 0.296 0.704 0.321 0.679 
Idaho -0.155 0.247 0.753 0.248 0.752 -0.009 -0.370 0.247 0.753 0.250 0.750 -0.022 -0.568 0.247 0.753 0.251 0.749 
Illinois -0.204 0.295 0.705 0.296 0.704 -0.012 -0.502 0.295 0.705 0.298 0.702 -0.030 -0.770 0.295 0.705 0.300 0.700 
Indiana -0.173 0.241 0.759 0.242 0.758 -0.010 -0.407 0.241 0.759 0.244 0.756 -0.024 -0.624 0.241 0.759 0.246 0.754 
Iowa -0.230 0.300 0.700 0.301 0.699 -0.013 -0.541 0.300 0.700 0.304 0.696 -0.032 -0.829 0.300 0.700 0.306 0.694 
Kansas -0.206 0.265 0.735 0.266 0.734 -0.012 -0.482 0.265 0.735 0.268 0.732 -0.029 -0.739 0.265 0.735 0.270 0.730 
Kentuck
y -0.181 0.269 0.731 0.271 0.729 -0.010 -0.428 0.269 0.731 0.273 0.727 -0.026 -0.656 0.270 0.730 0.274 0.726 
Louisia
na -0.181 0.299 0.701 0.300 0.700 -0.011 -0.455 0.299 0.701 0.302 0.698 -0.027 -0.697 0.299 0.701 0.304 0.696 
Maine -0.293 0.274 0.726 0.276 0.724 -0.016 -0.665 0.274 0.726 0.279 0.721 -0.040 -1.023 0.274 0.726 0.281 0.719 
Marylan
d -0.314 0.313 0.687 0.316 0.684 -0.018 -0.755 0.314 0.686 0.319 0.681 -0.045 -1.160 0.314 0.686 0.321 0.679 
Massac
husetts -0.480 0.319 0.681 0.323 0.677 -0.026 -1.081 0.320 0.680 0.327 0.673 -0.064 -1.667 0.320 0.680 0.331 0.669 
Michiga
n -0.252 0.246 0.754 0.248 0.752 -0.014 -0.572 0.246 0.754 0.251 0.749 -0.034 -0.880 0.247 0.753 0.253 0.747 
Minnes
ota -0.268 0.316 0.684 0.318 0.682 -0.015 -0.634 0.316 0.684 0.320 0.680 -0.038 -0.972 0.316 0.684 0.323 0.677 
Mississi
ppi -0.204 0.272 0.728 0.273 0.727 -0.012 -0.481 0.272 0.728 0.275 0.725 -0.029 -0.737 0.272 0.728 0.277 0.723 
Missour
i -0.153 0.247 0.753 0.248 0.752 -0.009 -0.367 0.247 0.753 0.250 0.750 -0.022 -0.562 0.247 0.753 0.251 0.749 
Montan
a -2.544 0.290 0.710 0.308 0.692 -0.122 -5.624 0.291 0.709 0.330 0.670 -0.301 -9.233 0.292 0.708 0.356 0.644 
Nebrask
a -0.227 0.329 0.671 0.330 0.670 -0.013 -0.547 0.329 0.671 0.332 0.668 -0.033 -0.839 0.329 0.671 0.334 0.666 
Nevada -0.296 0.314 0.686 0.316 0.684 -0.017 -0.691 0.314 0.686 0.319 0.681 -0.041 -1.061 0.314 0.686 0.321 0.679 
New 
Hampsh
ire -0.300 0.254 0.746 0.256 0.744 -0.016 -0.679 0.254 0.746 0.259 0.741 -0.040 -1.046 0.254 0.746 0.262 0.738 
New 
Jersey -0.417 0.339 0.661 0.342 0.658 -0.023 -0.969 0.339 0.661 0.345 0.655 -0.057 -1.490 0.339 0.661 0.349 0.651 
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New 
Mexico -0.266 0.319 0.681 0.320 0.680 -0.015 -0.620 0.319 0.681 0.323 0.677 -0.037 -0.952 0.319 0.681 0.325 0.675 
New 
York -0.807 0.449 0.551 0.453 0.547 -0.044 -1.843 0.449 0.551 0.459 0.541 -0.109 -2.841 0.450 0.550 0.465 0.535 
North 
Carolin
a -0.185 0.272 0.728 0.274 0.726 -0.011 -0.443 0.273 0.727 0.276 0.724 -0.026 -0.679 0.273 0.727 0.277 0.723 
North 
Dakota -0.237 0.352 0.648 0.353 0.647 -0.014 -0.565 0.352 0.648 0.355 0.645 -0.034 -0.866 0.352 0.648 0.357 0.643 
Ohio -0.230 0.277 0.723 0.278 0.722 -0.013 -0.529 0.277 0.723 0.280 0.720 -0.032 -0.812 0.277 0.723 0.282 0.718 
Oklaho
ma -0.138 0.253 0.747 0.254 0.746 -0.008 -0.338 0.253 0.747 0.255 0.745 -0.020 -0.517 0.253 0.747 0.257 0.743 
Oregon -0.241 0.324 0.676 0.326 0.674 -0.014 -0.581 0.324 0.676 0.328 0.672 -0.035 -0.890 0.324 0.676 0.330 0.670 
Pennsyl
vania -0.279 0.290 0.710 0.292 0.708 -0.016 -0.641 0.290 0.710 0.295 0.705 -0.038 -0.984 0.291 0.709 0.297 0.703 
Rhode 
Island -0.486 0.300 0.700 0.304 0.696 -0.026 -1.082 0.301 0.699 0.308 0.692 -0.064 -1.671 0.301 0.699 0.312 0.688 
South 
Carolin
a -0.242 0.282 0.718 0.284 0.716 -0.014 -0.563 0.282 0.718 0.286 0.714 -0.034 -0.865 0.283 0.717 0.289 0.711 
South 
Dakota -0.173 0.256 0.744 0.257 0.743 -0.010 -0.405 0.256 0.744 0.259 0.741 -0.024 -0.621 0.256 0.744 0.260 0.740 
Tenness
ee -0.180 0.266 0.734 0.267 0.733 -0.011 -0.433 0.266 0.734 0.269 0.731 -0.026 -0.664 0.266 0.734 0.271 0.729 
Texas -0.253 0.300 0.700 0.302 0.698 -0.014 -0.593 0.300 0.700 0.305 0.695 -0.035 -0.909 0.301 0.699 0.307 0.693 
Utah -0.231 0.314 0.686 0.315 0.685 -0.014 -0.557 0.314 0.686 0.318 0.682 -0.033 -0.854 0.314 0.686 0.320 0.680 
Vermon
t -0.452 0.324 0.676 0.327 0.673 -0.024 -1.013 0.324 0.676 0.331 0.669 -0.060 -1.560 0.324 0.676 0.334 0.666 
Virginia -0.202 0.284 0.716 0.286 0.714 -0.012 -0.503 0.284 0.716 0.288 0.712 -0.030 -0.771 0.284 0.716 0.290 0.710 
Washin
gton -0.230 0.351 0.649 0.353 0.647 -0.014 -0.571 0.351 0.649 0.355 0.645 -0.034 -0.875 0.352 0.648 0.357 0.643 
West 
Virginia -0.157 0.254 0.746 0.256 0.744 -0.009 -0.378 0.255 0.745 0.257 0.743 -0.023 -0.579 0.255 0.745 0.259 0.741 
Wiscon
sin -0.229 0.266 0.734 0.268 0.732 -0.013 -0.527 0.266 0.734 0.270 0.730 -0.031 -0.809 0.267 0.733 0.272 0.728 
Wyomi
ng -0.532 0.503 0.497 0.505 0.495 -0.030 -1.249 0.503 0.497 0.509 0.491 -0.075 -1.915 0.503 0.497 0.512 0.488 
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Min 
Value -2.544 0.241 0.384 0.242 0.380 -0.122 -5.624 0.241 0.383 0.244 0.375 -0.301 -9.233 0.241 0.383 0.246 0.370 
Max 
Value -0.138 0.616 0.759 0.620 0.758 -0.008 -0.338 0.617 0.759 0.625 0.756 -0.020 -0.517 0.617 0.759 0.630 0.754 
Mean 
Value -0.386 0.310 0.690 0.313 0.687 -0.020 -0.859 0.310 0.690 0.316 0.684 -0.045 -1.308 0.311 0.689 0.319 0.681 
Expected state with the highest take-up rate: Indiana  
Expected state with the lowest take-up rate: District of Columbia  
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c. Table 3.A3. Predicted Take-Up across States in the U.S: Adjusting the Cutoff Level 
of Required-Hour 
State 
Adj. Time 1 Doubling the time Adj. Time 2 Tripling the time 
% change of 
benchmark and 
adj. time 1 ¯π 
▁π with 
adj. time 1 
% change of 
benchmark and 
adj. time 2 ¯π 
▁π with adj. 
time 2 
Alabama 0.014147 0.265473 0.734527 0.028284 0.265369 0.734631 
Alaska 0.039673 0.533863 0.466137 0.079319 0.533678 0.466322 
Arizona 0.01621 0.273225 0.726775 0.032407 0.273107 0.726893 
Arkansas 0.011989 0.249322 0.750678 0.02397 0.249232 0.750768 
California 0.029968 0.366431 0.633569 0.059905 0.366241 0.633759 
Colorado 0.019506 0.318377 0.681623 0.038996 0.318244 0.681756 
Connecticut 0.026067 0.345033 0.654967 0.052109 0.344862 0.655138 
Delaware 0.02912 0.37741 0.62259 0.058211 0.377228 0.622772 
District of 
Columbia 0.09344 0.615948 0.384052 0.186772 0.61559 0.38441 
Florida 0.014399 0.250616 0.749384 0.028786 0.250508 0.749492 
Georgia 0.015342 0.26547 0.73453 0.030672 0.265357 0.734643 
Hawaii 0.021488 0.295657 0.704343 0.042954 0.295505 0.704495 
Idaho 0.01219 0.24698 0.75302 0.02437 0.246889 0.753111 
Illinois 0.018556 0.294725 0.705275 0.037095 0.294595 0.705405 
Indiana 0.012319 0.240884 0.759116 0.024628 0.240791 0.759209 
Iowa 0.016101 0.299707 0.700293 0.032189 0.299594 0.700406 
Kansas 0.014007 0.264828 0.735172 0.028004 0.264725 0.735275 
Kentucky 0.013398 0.269321 0.730679 0.026786 0.269223 0.730777 
Louisiana 0.018119 0.298806 0.701194 0.036222 0.298679 0.701321 
Maine 0.015553 0.273659 0.726341 0.031094 0.273546 0.726454 
Maryland 0.024817 0.313315 0.686685 0.049607 0.313145 0.686855 
Massachusetts 0.022749 0.319216 0.680784 0.045477 0.319062 0.680938 
Michigan 0.01317 0.246273 0.753727 0.026329 0.246173 0.753827 
Minnesota 0.019363 0.315884 0.684116 0.03871 0.315752 0.684248 
Mississippi 0.014488 0.27152 0.72848 0.028964 0.271414 0.728586 
Missouri 0.012288 0.246664 0.753336 0.024567 0.246572 0.753428 
Montana 0.01449 0.289898 0.710102 0.02897 0.289795 0.710205 
Nebraska 0.018487 0.328394 0.671606 0.036959 0.32827 0.67173 
Nevada 0.019797 0.313898 0.686102 0.039577 0.313762 0.686238 
New Hampshire 0.015219 0.253651 0.746349 0.030424 0.253537 0.746463 
New Jersey 0.026371 0.338891 0.661109 0.052716 0.338717 0.661283 
New Mexico 0.017747 0.318559 0.681441 0.03548 0.318438 0.681562 
New York 0.043409 0.448758 0.551242 0.086771 0.44852 0.55148 
North Carolina 0.014515 0.272388 0.727612 0.029018 0.272283 0.727717 
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North Dakota 0.018344 0.35155 0.64845 0.036676 0.351431 0.648569 
Ohio 0.014004 0.276486 0.723514 0.027997 0.276385 0.723615 
Oklahoma 0.012391 0.252824 0.747176 0.024774 0.252731 0.747269 
Oregon 0.019535 0.323896 0.676104 0.039054 0.323764 0.676236 
Pennsylvania 0.01634 0.290175 0.709825 0.032668 0.290059 0.709941 
Rhode Island 0.019792 0.300244 0.699756 0.039567 0.300105 0.699895 
South Carolina 0.01579 0.28222 0.71778 0.031567 0.282107 0.717893 
South Dakota 0.011741 0.255603 0.744397 0.023474 0.255516 0.744484 
Tennessee 0.014723 0.265976 0.734024 0.029434 0.265868 0.734132 
Texas 0.017303 0.30025 0.69975 0.034593 0.300129 0.699871 
Utah 0.018795 0.313558 0.686442 0.037576 0.31343 0.68657 
Vermont 0.020246 0.323808 0.676192 0.040474 0.323671 0.676329 
Virginia 0.019225 0.283985 0.716015 0.038432 0.283848 0.716152 
Washington 0.021803 0.351261 0.648739 0.043588 0.35112 0.64888 
West Virginia 0.012552 0.25438 0.74562 0.025094 0.254286 0.745714 
Wisconsin 0.013716 0.266288 0.733712 0.027421 0.266187 0.733813 
Wyoming 0.037036 0.502586 0.497414 0.074045 0.502402 0.497598 
Min Value 0.011741 0.240884 0.384052 0.023474 0.240791 0.38441 
Max Value 0.09344 0.615948 0.759116 0.186772 0.61559 0.759209 
Mean Value 0.020232 0.310159 0.689841 0.040447 0.310028 0.689972 
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d. Table 3.A4. Housing Weight  
 
Income Range 
Site Energy 
Consumption 
Per Household 
Member 
(million Btu)    
Site Energy 
Consumption 
Per Household 
Member (kWh)    
Percentage of 
electricity 
used 
Estimated 
Electricity 
usage only 
Per 
Household 
Member 
Estimated 
Household 
Energy 
Expenditures 
Housing 
Weight 
Weighted 
Estimated 
Electricity 
usage only 
Per 
Household 
Member 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
 (3) 
 
(3) 
(kWh) 
(5) 
 
(6) (7) 
(kWh) 
(8) 
Less than $20,000 33.5 9817.880851 44.27801 4347.162 1,596 0.162561 706.677 
$20,000 to $39,999 32.2 9436.888459 43.95707 4148.18 1,773 0.18788 779.3589 
$40,000 to $59,000 32.8 9612.731102 44.41446 4269.443 2,044 0.212635 907.8316 
$60,000 to $79,999 34.6 10140.25903 43.83976 4445.465 2,554 0.251867 1119.667 
$80,000 to $99,999 34.8 10198.87324 42.91667 4377.016 2,988 0.292991 1282.427 
$100,000 to $119,999 37.8 11078.08645 40.12346 4444.911 3,496 0.315593 1402.784 
$120,000 or More 43.3 12689.97734 39.86146 5058.41 4,091 0.322343 1630.541 
 
Some notes on the calculation of housing weight.  
 
1. Housing weight is calculated based on the following ratio: 
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒
, which is 
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛 6
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛 2
. 
2. The first three rows of energy expenditure (column 6) is based on data from americaspower.org,31 while the rest rows are 
based on the average percentage of increase of the first three rows (i.e. 11%, 15% and 25% respectively), which is 17%. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Based on table 1 of “Energy Cost Impacts on American Families, 2001-2012” on 
http://www.americaspower.org/sites/default/files/Energy_Cost_Impacts_2012_FINAL.pdf, accessed on July 20, 2015 
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